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Abstract 
One of the objectives of the U.S. government is to balance the individual’s right to 
privacy and national security interests. Trusted Traveler programs create a risk-based 
security model where the traveling public is categorized into low or high risk. There are, 
however, some privacy concerns related to the acceptance of the use of biometric 
technology in the adoption of expedited security screening procedures in commercial 
airports. The theoretical construct of this case study of the TSA Pre-Check Program is 
based on Ajzen and Fischbein’s theory of reasoned action, specifically through Davis’ 
technology acceptance model.  The purpose of this case study was to explore the 
perceptions of the traveling public regarding the protection of privacy and the use of 
biometric technologies. Data for this study included 325 social media postings, 50 
privacy complaints reported to the Department of Homeland Security between 2009 and 
2014, and publicly available data from the Government Accountability Office about 
expedited screening for the years 2011 – 2014.  Data were coded into a priori themes and 
then subjected to a content analysis procedure.  Findings indicate that the traveling public 
generally support expedited security screening and consent to waiving certain privacy 
rights in order to facilitate expedited screening.  Complaints from travelers were also 
primarily related to wait times and secondary screening, and not privacy concerns. The 
positive social change implications stemming from this study include recommendations 
to the TSA to expand the Trusted Traveler programs such that the primary concern of the 
traveling public, reduction of wait time is balanced against privacy concerns about the 
collection of biometric data as part of a measured response to aviation security.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
 Through the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States and the world 
became aware of the reality of terrorism. Governments around the world created counter-
terrorism measures to aviation security, as aviation was the chosen method by terrorist 
organizations to execute attacks due to its high media coverage. As a response to the 
terrorist attacks, the United States federal government passed and approved the U.S. 
Patriot Act of 2001 and the Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) 
enabling the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  
The ATSA established a new department that allowed for more communication 
and information sharing among different government agencies (TSA, 2013). In March 
2003, two years after the creation of the TSA, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) was created to supervise the TSA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
which are the agencies entrusted with the implementation and management of Trusted 
Traveler programs (DHS, 2014). 
Background of the Study 
For a decade DHS and its agencies implemented a single model of screening for 
incoming and outgoing travelers in the United States and its territories. Through time and 
with congressional pressure, DHS sought innovative ways of conducting their operations 
as a result of budgetary cuts (TSA, 2009). In 2009, DHS introduced a series of Trusted 
Traveler programs that enable travelers to enroll in an expedited security screening 
experience within the United States and its territories. The TSA introduced a similar 
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program in 2011 allowing frequent flyers the opportunity to pilot the program and set its 
implementation in 2013 (TSA, 2013).  
In 2013, DHS agencies had fully implemented the Trusted Traveler Programs 
where enrollment is based on a traveler’s background history, biometric collection, and 
acceptance of terms and conditions; with a renewal process at 5-year intervals (TSA, 
2014). The DHS introduced biometrics into the expedited screening process for outgoing 
and incoming travelers to ensure citizen safety and freedom of commerce (9/11 
Commission Report, 2004).  
Trusted Traveler Programs are designed to target specific travelers and their 
needs. Global Entry is for the U.S. business traveler who often travels internationally and 
wants to speed through the lines upon entry into the United States and its territories 
(CBP, 2014). NEXUS is for the traveler who often travels to Canada for business or 
pleasure, SENTRI is for the traveler crossing between the United States and Mexico, and 
FAST is for the movement of shipping goods, provided that the company and driver are 
categorized as low risk (CBP, 2014).  
These programs are administrated by CBP, which has agreements with other 
national governments such as Canada, Mexico, South Korea, Netherlands, Australia, and 
New Zealand to have enrolled travelers receive expedited security screening in those 
countries. Pre-Check is administered by the TSA and offers expedited security screening 
through commercial airports (TSA, 2013). The traveler has the option to enroll in any 
CBP program and will automatically receive entry into the TSA Pre-Check program as 
long as the traveler is flying with a participating airline carrier (CBP, 2014). 
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All of these Trusted Traveler programs include the capture of personal 
identification information (PII) such as biometrics to be used in the enrollment process. 
The collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of PII is protected under the Privacy 
Act of 1974 and requires federal agencies to give public notice of their system of records 
by publication in the Federal Register; therefore, prohibiting the disclosure of information 
from a system of records without the written consent of the individual, unless the 
disclosure is under the 12 statutory exceptions (Woodward, 2008, pp. 357-379).  
Statement of the Problem 
To enforce the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report to enhance 
security measures, DHS agencies need to be in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974.  
The DHS has to address the concerns of privacy advocates who insist that the 
government is infringing into the civil liberties of the individual (Nelson, 2004). 
Therefore, DHS must be able to address these concerns related to privacy, before it is 
able to implement the use of biometrics as a security measure for screening of incoming 
and outgoing travelers (Nelson, 2004).  
Besides remaining in compliance with the Privacy Act requirements and 
addressing the concerns of privacy advocates, DHS agencies have to consider the 
differences in individuals’ attitudes, and perspectives.  The acceptance of the technology 
has to be considered as the “end-user” will be affected by the collection, and the use of 
biometrics to enhance security in the expedited screening procedures (Moroson, 2012). 
The understanding of such individual beliefs can help DHS, TSA, airport managers, and 
industry experts in making decisions about whether the introduction of biometrics into 
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the expedited security procedures would be met with resistance or acceptance among the 
traveling public (Boo & Jones, 2009).  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this mixed-method study was to investigate privacy concerns of 
travelers regarding the use of biometrics in Trusted Traveler Programs. In this study, I 
investigated whether ease to use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the adopted 
biometric technology would influence its implementation into the expedited screening 
procedures of commercial airports in the United States.  
In the study, I explored the various trends in the acceptance of biometric 
technologies in a commercial airport environment based on the Trusted Travelers given 
perception of privacy and airport experience and examined the factors that may 
contribute to the propensity of DHS agencies to adopt biometric technology into the 
expedited screening process. The role of human behaviors plays a significant role in the 
implementation of any public policy and must be considered in organizational operations. 
It is important that human behaviors be explored as they may have the ability to impact 
the adoption of new technologies and expedited security procedures (Chan, 2002).  
Nature of the Study 
The overall research design was to explore the relationship between privacy 
concerns of the individual participating in a Trusted Traveler Program and the adoption 
of biometric technologies into the identity verification process in commercial airports as 
an expedited security procedure. I used a document review as a method of collecting data 
from multiple sources of information. According to Creswell (2007), the document 
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review method is used when there is a need for the data to answer what and how 
questions. The first phase of the data collection has been incorporated into the literature 
review, and included supporting documents that covered the use of biometrics in Trusted 
Traveler Programs (2011-2014). It also covered the theoretical foundation of the study 
(Davis’ TAM model).  
The second phase of the data (Chapter 4) collection process included primary and 
secondary documents that covered the reaction of individuals enrolled into Trusted 
Traveler Programs and their concerns about privacy, ease of use, and usefulness of the 
biometric system. I examined archival documents to determine the government’s actions 
to safeguard an enrollee’s privacy and the role of attitudes, organizational factors, and 
social demographics in the process of the acceptance to the use of biometric technologies. 
Further discussion of the methodology and the research design used is provided in 
Chapter 3.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided the study:  
Research Question 1: Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of 
biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?  
Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, 
and security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening 
procedures at commercial airports?  
Theoretical Foundations 
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The theoretical framework is based upon Morosan (2012) research on feelings 
generated on the use of biometric technology in various industries. It further focuses on 
the technology acceptance model (TAM) by Davis (1989). Davis’ TAM discusses the 
ease of use of the technology and theories between organizational, social, and technical 
factors that Trusted Travelers experience within a commercial airport environment to 
enhance security measures.  
In this study, Davis’ TAM was reference as it takes into account an individual’s 
perceived ease of use and the usefulness of the technology (Davis, 1989). Furthermore, 
Davis’ (1989) model explains the two beliefs that determine the attitudes for 
organizations to adopt new technologies. The model suggests that the attitude towards 
adoption will likely be decided on the adopter’s positive or negative experience 
(Grembergen & Haes, 2008).  
Trusted Traveler Programs incorporate a change in society because it places the 
traveling public into two categories, low-risk  and high-risk  changing air travel screening 
procedures. When a traveler decides to participate in a program, he or she willingly gives 
up personal information in order to obtain benefits that expedite security screening during 
traveling. 
Operational Definitions of Terms  
Biometric: The digital representation of an individual’s distinct behavioral and 
physical characteristics (NSTC, 2006a).  
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Biometric template: Is the information captured of a sample of a biometric that 
becomes the electronic data based on the observation of the characteristics of an 
individual (NSTC, 2006a). 
Biometric system: Is the process of comparing sets of biometric data with an 
existing set that was previously collected, it is used to assist human-driven comparisons 
to help screening officers compare an image of an individual on an identification card or 
on a storage device (NSTC, 2006a). This process collects a sample, converts that sample 
into a template and compares the templates to those previously collected (GAO, 2002). 
All biometric systems perform recognition to again know a person who has previously 
enrolled into the system. These systems conduct a verification process by the comparison 
of a new biometric with an existing one that has previously enrolled into the system 
(Morosan, 2012).  
Enrollment: The process that a biometric system is specifically set to identify a 
person. The person must present an identifier that later is link to an acquisition device 
producing a biometric template (GAO, 2002, p.3).  
Verification: The process to confirm whether an individual is who they claim to 
be and the transaction that connects the process governing the physical access to the 
resources of an organization (NSTC, 2006a). 
Identification: The process to confirm whether an individual is who they claim to 
be except that no identifier is provided. A trial template is compared with the reference 
templates of all those enrolled into the system (GAO, 2002, p.4).  
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False match rate: This occurs when a system incorrectly matches an identity 
(GAO, 2002, p.5).  
False non-match rate: This occurs when a system rejects a valid identity (GAO, 
2002, p. 5). 
Failure to enroll rate: This rate measures the probability that a person will be 
unable to enroll into a biometric system (GAO, 2002, p.5.).  
Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management: This subcommittee is 
under the U.S Government National Science & Technology Council (NSTC). The 
council developed a report on the examination of the implementation of biometrics into 
the use of government services. The subcommittee examined the use of biometrics of 
government services into data management, collection of biometrics, ease of use and 
speed in verification, and an appeal process in the event that the technology fails to verify 
the individual (NSTC, 2006a). 
Privacy: The conceptual definition of privacy based on Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) is the “claim that an individual’s interest arises as an assertion against other 
individuals or organizations to prevent interference from an individual’s autonomy” 
(Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Each individual has the desire for physical space where he or 
she can be free from embarrassment, accountability, intrusion, or interruption, and the 
attempt to control the disclosures of personal information about themselves (Warren & 
Brandeis, 1890).   
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The Privacy Act of 1974: The law requires a set of fair information principles 
governing how the government collects, use, and maintains the use of personally 
identifiable information in databases and record systems (Nelson, 2004). 
The Government Act of 2002: The law requires government agencies to 
implement assessments of the use of information technology and the potential affects it 
may bring on privacy (Nelson, 2004).  
Trusted Traveler: Is a U.S. citizen or foreign national who has been approved by 
CBP to participate in a Trusted Traveler Program and is eligible for expedited security 
screening with TSA Pre-Check (CBP, 2014).  
Trusted Traveler Program: Program that provides expedited security screening 
travel for pre-approved, low risk travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks (CBP, 
2014.)    
Significance of the Study 
  The study is significant because it allows DHS agencies to explore various 
options when planning to adopt biometrics into the expedited screening procedures across 
commercial airports in the United States and its territories, as it relates to matters of 
privacy. The study makes it contribution to the literature by specifically addressing 
privacy in Trusted Traveler programs as it relates to expedited security screening and the 
adoption of biometric technologies in commercial airports (Merlano, 2014, p. 1).  
Assumptions 
In this study, I assumed that travelers enrolled in Trusted Traveler programs under 
DHS agencies enjoyed the benefits of having a faster security experience through the 
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checkpoints in the United States and its territories. However, some researchers have 
raised questions about the effectiveness of biometric systems into security systems based 
on the capture and verification rates of current technology developments (NSTC, 2006a). 
The Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management under the NSTC reported in 
2006 that the “effectiveness of a particular biometric technology is dependent on how and 
where the technology is used” (p.5). 
To avoid any bias about the benefits of Trusted Traveler programs, I explored the 
arguments of privacy advocates and those organizations that state that an individual 
should not give up their right to privacy, or release personal information to have a faster 
security screening experience; to draw a broad picture about the adoption of biometrics 
into the expedited screening process in a commercial airport environment.  
I also assumed that the participants in the archival complaints submitted to the 
DHS Privacy Office that were used in this study answered truthfully and provided honest 
answers to the questions on the complaint forms. I tried to account for the effect of this 
assumption by analyzing different privacy annual reports and GAO reports on privacy 
assessments that revealed various points of view (data triangulation).  
Another assumption was that the data collected from the complaints and archival 
documents were comprehensive and gathered the relevant information needed to answer 
the questions of the study. A data collection form was developed to summarize the data 
that was collected from all the documents, which helped me to compile and analyzed the 
findings.  
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The final assumption was that responses to the study questions truthfully reflected 
the assessments of legal experts.  The legal system has not yet included new advances in 
technology into its legal interpretation; therefore, balancing an individual’s right to 
privacy had not been addressed in this regard. I tried to reach a group of specialists 
dealing with legal matters under the subject of national security. I did this in an attempt to 
provide various points of view on effective and efficient security measures while 
remaining compliant with laws pertaining to privacy and the traveling public.      
Scope of the Study 
The implementation of Trusted Traveler Programs was an initiative by the DHS to 
free resources as a result of budget reductions. The programs created a risk-based model 
in security screening where it classified travelers into categories in which the government 
had known or little information of individuals. The scope of the study was to extend an 
assessment of the effects of Trusted Traveler programs and the potential to adopt 
biometric systems to be implemented into the expedited security screening of travelers in 
a commercial airport environment. The study involved the views of specialists from 
national and international organizations, as well as individual’s enrolled into a Trusted 
Traveler Program that had knowledge about the enrollment process and the benefits of 
the current programs as describe by the GAO and the DHS Privacy Office.  
Limitations and Delimitations 
This research was about the privacy concerns related to the use of biometric 
technology in Trusted Traveler programs specifically applied to the commercial airport 
environment. The overall research design was an explanatory case study that included a 
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document review analysis. The review of primary documents (number of enrollees, 
institution’s reports, and agency data) was complemented with the selection of secondary 
data (journal articles, newspaper articles, and social media reactions) to see the extent of 
the use of Trusted Traveler programs in public policy.  
The study results will be disseminated to countries looking to implement these 
types of risk-based security programs. The purpose is to allow countries to consider when 
possible, the results of the study in developing or implementing Trusted Traveler 
programs to free up resources and develop security standards based on intelligence driven 
data. Yet, the creation of a set of suggestions that may work for all countries is not within 
the scope of this study because each country has specific set conditions, and what works 
in the United States might not be applicable to other countries. Thus, in future studies, 
this topic might be worthy of examination for other countries engaged in national security 
policies. 
Implications for Social Change  
By placing this study within the body of the research on social and political 
change, the results may be used to enhance the discussion for the U.S Supreme Court to 
bring about a clear interpretation of the fourth amendment and the U.S. Patriot Act of 
2001. This research contributes to the deficiency in the literature as it addresses the 
privacy aspect through legal matters as it relates to advances in information technology. 
This study may give authorities, scholars, and specialists the opportunity to determine 
which actions should be implemented in their policies.  
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The implementation of Trusted Traveler programs in American civil society has 
already impacted the traveling public and commerce in commercial airports (Neyland, 
2009). The American people will have to make the decision to give up their personal 
privacy in order to receive the benefits of expedited security during the screening process 
or not participate in such programs and continue to get standard screening in commercial 
airports. Yet, Trusted Traveler programs are not just limited to the airport environment, 
but those of border crossings and marine time entry within the U.S for the import and 
export of commerce.  
The goal of such research was to make a contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge on the subject, so that individua ls and civil society in the U.S. could better 
understand issues and problems; propose and arrive at solutions, and foster the 
continuation of change-oriented debate in public policy. 
The implementation of Trusted Traveler programs with the adoption of biometric 
technologies into the expedited screening process may interest other countries with 
similar characteristics to those of the U.S. to implement programs of the same nature 
(Neyland, 2009). It is hoped that this research will provide a platform for other 
researchers to build on and conduct further studies on the subject.    
Chapter Summary 
The main purpose of this research was to explore and explain the relationship 
between the privacy concerns of travelers and the adoption of biometrics into the 
expedited screening process of outgoing travelers in Trusted Traveler programs. 
Furthermore, the relationship between privacy, the adoption and use of biometrics is to 
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include the role of different stakeholders, local, state, and national legislation, and 
explore and explain whether the traveler is accepting of the technology that would be 
incorporated as it relates to privacy. For this research, a mixed method approach design 
was chosen. Two research questions guided the study. The questions were answered 
through quantitative and qualitative methods to understand technology acceptance.  
In Chapter 2, I presented a review of the literature about the concept of expedited 
screening, the use of biometric technology as it relates to expedited screening and how 
privacy provisions must be addressed for its implementations on political and social 
change. I specifically focus on Davis’ (1989) model on technology acceptance as the 
selected framework for the study. I reviewed recent studies to set the contextual 
background for the possible use of biometrics into the expedited screening of passengers. 
Details of the research design are presented in Chapter 3, including the data collection 
and data analysis methods. In Chapter 4, I presented the results of the documents 
reviewed to answer the research questions. Chapter 5 included the interpretation of the 
findings, recommendations for the application of the findings, implications for social 
change, and recommendations for further studies.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this literature review, I focused on the concept of privacy and its importance to 
the adoption and use of biometric systems in Trusted Traveler programs administered by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, I discussed Davis’ (1989) TAM 
as a selected theoretical framework for the study based on the findings of Morosan 
(2012). Additionally, I presented a critical evaluation of the TAM model and provided 
examples of its application in various contexts.  
Furthermore, the debate between an individual’s right to privacy and the 
government’s responsibility to develop security programs for its national security needs 
creates challenges to civil rights and liberties. I presented background information 
regarding Trusted Traveler programs in an attempt to understand the existing literature 
written related to an individual’s right to privacy and the use of biometric technologies 
for expedited screening. I incorporated and highlighted the studies on social, political, 
and economic change, as well as the approaches and theories used: and the limitations of 
these studies. 
The literature for the review came from various scholarly sources in the Walden 
University library. The following databases were searched: PROQUEST, EBSCO, 
JSTOR, Naval Graduate Academy, and SAGE found in the Walden Library. The 
databases were searched using the following keywords: Trusted Traveler Program, 
registered traveler program, risk -based security, expedited screening, TSA Pre-Check, 
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Global Entry, privacy in trusted traveler programs, biometrics, biometric systems, 
biometric technologies, low-risk passenger, aviation security, and privacy concerns. 
Other keywords used included ease of use biometric technology and privacy 
requirements based on the federal definitions in the Privacy Act of 1974 and how the 
TAM model would provide an integrated model for the adoption of biometric technology 
into the expedited screening of passengers. 
The Concept of Expedited Screening 
 The TSA uses the term expedited screening as a screening process that is more 
convenient and efficient to screen individuals that the agency has gathered sufficient 
background information classifying them as low-risk, compared to those receiving 
standardize screening as no information is known beforehand (TSA, 2014). Passengers 
qualifying for expedited screening no longer have to remove their shoes, can keep 
permitted small liquids, gels, and laptops inside of their carry-on bag; and are allowed to 
keep on their jackets and belts while passing through the walk through metal detectors 
through security screening checkpoints (TSA, 2014). If the passenger has an alarm, those 
items must be removed for alarm resolution (TSA, 2014).  
 Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST are Trusted Traveler programs that 
expedite the security screening of low-risk passengers and shipments across the border 
through lanes and kiosks dedicated to Trusted Travelers at Ports of Entry (CBP, 2013). 
TSA Pre-Check was implemented in October 2011 and is a Trusted Traveler Program 
that allow Trusted Travelers to receive expedited screening at security checkpoints in 
commercial airports (GAO, 2014a, p.4). Trusted Travelers registered under programs 
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with CBP are automatically eligible to received TSA Pre-Check at commercial airports in 
the United States.  
 The purpose of Trusted Traveler programs is for participants to receive expedited 
travel benefits through dedicated lanes and kiosks at checkpoints and ports of entry 
throughout the United States. All Trusted Traveler programs rely on the vetting of 
travelers who voluntarily applied for membership by providing personal information and 
paying a fee to either CBP or TSA (GAO, 2014a, p.12). Those travelers are granted 
Trusted Traveler status and are considered low-risk compared to others as a result of the 
vetting process that CBP and TSA conduct during the enrollment process and afterwards 
(GAO, 2014a, p.12).  
Trusted Traveler Programs allow program participants to go through the same 
screening procedures as regular travelers with the exception that Trusted Travelers have a 
special identification card that is compliant with the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative (WHTI) and requires the submission of biometrics (GAO, 2014a, p.12). The 
card automatically notifies CBP through its computer system at primary inspection 
booths of an individual’s trusted status. If a Trusted Traveler is referred to secondary 
inspection, he or she would be moved to the front of the line because of its Trusted 
Traveler status (GAO, 2014a, p.12). 
 When lanes and kiosks dedicated to Trusted Travelers become long, CBP and 
TSA implement a technique called active lane management to ensure that Trusted 
Travelers’ wait times are lower compare to regular travelers at ports of entry and 
screening checkpoints (GAO, 2014a, p.13). The CBP uses active lane management by 
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switching regular traffic lanes to Trusted Traveler lanes when wait times become too long 
for Trusted Travelers (GAO, 2014a, p.13). If there are few Trusted Travelers in the 
dedicated lanes, those lanes get converted to regular travelers to maintain low wait-times 
and faster processing (GAO, 2014b. p.5).  
 The TSA employs a similar concept named Managed Inclusion for its Pre-Check 
program at commercial airport checkpoints who have dedicated Pre-Check lanes that are 
under use when wait-times are too long in the standard lane using a criterion based on 
risk assessments and low-risk eligibility (GAO, 2014a, p.13). Managed Inclusion enables 
the risk assessment of passengers in real-time to determine their risk-level through the 
use of randomization procedures, behavior detection officers (BDOs), canine screening 
teams, and explosive trace detection (ETD) devices (GAO, 2014b, p.5).  
 In November 2015, the TSA reduced the use of Managed Inclusion with the use 
of BDOs and ETDs in commercial airports as a result of audits conducted by the 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG). OIG stated that the agency had 
not tested the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process (GAO, 2016, p.1).  The 
OIG report stated that TSA’s behavior detection and analysis program, had not 
demonstrated that behavioral indicators can be used to effectively and reliably identify 
passengers who many pose a threat to aviation security (Improve Oversight, 2016, p.10). 
The presented form of Managed Inclusion implemented by the agency is with the use of 
canine screening teams (GAO, 2016, p. 2). 
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Figure 1: How the TSA operates managed inclusion with ETD devices 
 The expedited travel benefits for Trusted Travelers through CBP allows those 
with Trusted Traveler status to enter at point of entries, by just scanning their passports at 
dedicated kiosks and progressing through primary inspection booth without meeting a 
CBP officer (GAO, 2014b, p.10). At the kiosk, Trusted Travelers submit their passports, 
answer a series of questions, have their picture taken, and submit their fingerprint to 
verify their identity (CBP, 2013).  
The kiosk notifies the traveler that they have been cleared to enter the country, or 
are being referred to secondary inspection (GAO, 2014b, p.10). When cleared to enter the 
country, the Trusted Traveler shows their passport and their receipt from the kiosk to 
ensure the receipt is valid and matches the passenger (GAO, 2014b, p.10). If the receipt is 
clear, the passenger is allowed into the country. If the receipt has a large X on it, the 
passenger is referred to secondary inspection (CBP, 2013). 
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Figure 2: Trusted Traveler POEs by program.  
 In the case of TSA, its expedited airport screening is based on low-risk 
populations and “Trusted Traveler or Known Traveler” status – those who have 
volunteered personal information to TSA, so that the TSA can confirmed those “Trusted 
or Known Travelers” are low risk (TSA, 2013). The TSA Pre-Check program allows for 
the expedited screening of low- risk populations such as children 12 years and younger, 
75 and older adults, known crew members, Trusted Traveler programs through CBP, 
frequent flyers choosing to opt-in through their air carriers, and through TSA Pre-Check 
membership (GAO, 2014b, pp.8-9). 
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Figure 3: TSA Pre- lists 
 In December 2015, TSA officials announced that the branches of the U.S. armed 
forces including those on Reserve and National Guard personnel were eligible to 
participate (GAO, 2016, p.5). In addition, members of the intelligence community, TSA 
employees, Department of State (Top Secret Cleared) employees, and foreign citizens 
participating in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs were eligible to participate (GAO, 2016, 
p.6). 
 TSA Pre-Check enables the participating air carriers to technologically send the 
necessary passenger information to Secure Flight for vetting against federal government 
watch lists and print the low-risk designation in the encrypted boarding pass bar code and 
the TSA Pre-Check designation on the boarding pass (GAO, 2014a, p.13). 
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Figure 4: Examples of boarding passes with the TSA Pre- Designation 
 The process to apply for TSA Pre-Check membership includes visiting a 
enrollment center, where individual’s must provide their biographic information such as 
name, date of birth, address, citizenship documentation, a second source of identification, 
and fingerprints to undergo a security threat assessment (TSA, 2013).  
 As a result of previous programs implemented by the TSA such as Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), the agency was able to leverage existing 
capabilities into their enrollment process and threat assessments from program applicants 
(GAO, 2014, p.18). In order to be eligible to participate in TSA Pre-Check, applicants 
must be a U.S. citizen, U.S. national or a lawful permanent resident and must not have 
been convicted of certain crimes (GAO, 2014a, P.18).  
 The system of Secure Flight is used at commercial airports to automatically match 
a traveler’s information that has been collected by the air carriers to screen against the 
various watch lists (No Fly and Selectee Lists) 72 hours before a travelers’ scheduled 
departure (GAO, 2010, p.3). Once the verification is completed through the watch lists, 
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Secure Flight indicates the air carriers to mark a traveler’s boarding pass for expedited 
screening, enhance screening, standard screening or is prohibited from boarding the 
aircraft (GAO, 2010, p.5).  ).  
 The same system is used to identify travelers who are eligible for expedited 
screening at commercial airports by utilizing the same information collected by the air 
carriers and vetting that information through the low-risk lists (GAO, 2014a, p.29). 
Afterwards, the TSA notifies the traveler of their eligibility by informing the air carriers 
to mark the boarding pass with the TSA Pre-Check designation (GAO, 2014a, p.19). 
 
Figure 5: TSA Secure Flight screening process 
 For some commercial airports, the TSA has dedicated TSA Pre-Check expedited 
screening lanes for those travelers having the TSA Pre-Check designation on their 
boarding pass (TSA, 2014). The participation into the program is completely voluntary 
and a traveler who has been designated as eligible for TSA Pre-Check expedited 
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screening may elect not to use the dedicated lanes according to TSA officials (TSA, 
2014). Not all commercial airports can afford to have dedicated TSA Pre-Check 
expedited screening lanes due to space restrictions and low volume of passengers with 
Pre-Check designation that do not warrant a dedicated lane (GAO, 2014a, p.19). 
 In those commercial airports where Pre-Check dedicated lanes are unavailable, 
travelers with the TSA Pre-Check designation can still experience expedited screening of 
“their person” (ex: does not remove shoes, belts, and light jackets) but must divest their 
permitted liquids, and laptops from their carry-on baggage, since the screening process 
used in standard lanes are different from those in expedited screening lanes (GAO, 
2014a, p.19).  
 The selection in which the TSA determines who is eligible for expedited 
screening is based on three risk assessment methods. The first method is verifying an 
individual’s name through the TSA Pre-Check List of known travelers (GAO, 2014, p.9). 
The second method is the designation of a traveler’s identification as low-risk under the 
TSA’s Risk Assessment Algorithm (GAO, 2014b, p.9). The third method is the real time 
assessment of a traveler at the airport under the Managed Inclusion Process (GAO, 2014, 
p.9).  
 The concept to use expedited screening through Trusted Traveler Programs was 
proposed by Northwest CEO Richard Anderson in 2002. He stated “Trusted Traveler 
Programs is one example of how industry, working with government, can quickly bring 
to market programs that would relieve some of the burden on aviation security” (Melnik, 
2002).  
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Foundations for a Risk-Based Security System 
 The development of Trusted Traveler Programs came from the idea that not all 
travelers present the same security threat level. This idea expanded in the creation of a 
risk-based approach to aviation security. Countries such as Israel and the European Union 
focus their security resources on identifying risky travelers enabling them to match their 
resources to those risks, rather than screening everyone the same (GAO, 2002, p.3) The 
risk-based model approach provides security officials the ability to direct more resources 
and obtained better screening equipment for travelers exposing a higher risk to security. 
Therefore, the model allows for the improvement in detection and increase deterrence 
compared to the one-size fit all approach (GAO, 2002, p.8). 
 Trusted Traveler Programs serve as a risk management tool as it chooses the 
appropriate level of screening for a traveler depending on a prior assessment of their 
personal background and the individual’s threat to security. These programs decrease the 
inconveniences and uncertainties of the amount of time and the level of security, travelers 
would experience as they pass through a security checkpoint in a commercial airport 
(GAO, 2002, p.3).  
 The President and CEO of the U.S. Travel Association Roger Dow stated “These 
programs would encourage travelers, especially business travelers to fly more often, 
therefore, improving the economic health of the United States” (U.S. Travel Association, 
2010). Additionally, other related industries would also benefit from these programs such 
as tourism, aviation-related manufacturers, transportation workers and commerce creating 
a healthy economy (U.S. Travel Association, 2010).   
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 Dow (2010) highlighted that Trusted Traveler programs should be the centerpiece 
for an enhanced air travel security system by screening passengers for security risks prior 
to entering the checkpoints (p.3). The programs pre-screens the individual before arriving 
at the airport and this risk assessment reduces the line in the airport and allows security 
resources to be used for individuals presenting a higher risk level (p.3).   
 Additionally, these programs have the ability to deter potential threats as they 
create an effective and efficient approach to security that alleviates congestion at security 
checkpoint, as a congestive atmosphere becomes attractive to potential terrorists (p.3). 
Furthermore, according to Dow (2010) these programs protect the privacy and civil 
liberties by eliminating physical security measures for those enrolled into the program by 
strengthening public trust as the federal government works on balancing privacy, civil 
liberties, efficiency and security, as those travelers are deem low-risk (Dow, 2010).   
 Based on the views and influence of various stakeholders in the aviation industry, 
the TSA in 2002 introduced a pilot for a registered traveler type program for 
transportation workers. The program called Transportation Worker Identity Credential 
(TWIC) provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential for maritime workers giving 
them unescorted access to secure areas into port facilities, outer continental self-facilities, 
and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the 
U.S. Coast Guard (TWIC, 2013).  
 The application process for the TWIC card requires for applicants to submit 
biographic and biometric information to include fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph, 
and pass a security threat assessment (TWIC, 2013). Once accepted into the program, the 
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card issued has a computer chip, known as an Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) storing the 
holders’ biometric and personal information (TWIC, 2013).  
 Furthermore, stakeholders such as airport managers, airlines, and law enforcement 
entities found that such programs could contribute to enhanced customer service, 
expedited check-in at airports, track frequent flier miles, collect information obtained 
during background checks to help identify individuals wanted by the police, or tracking 
the movement of citizens who might pose criminal risks (GAO, 2002, p.8). Since Trusted 
Traveler programs are voluntary, passengers choose to participate in these programs. This 
model assumes that a background check would accept all members of the non-terrorist 
public who apply and are granted Trusted Traveler status, while rejecting all terrorists 
(Chan, Jackson, & Latourrette, 2012).  
 According to Chan et al. (2012) some fraction of the non-terrorist population will 
apply and be rejected incorrectly, as some fraction of terrorists will be accepted 
incorrectly into the program (p.3). However, CBP and TSA maintained that Trusted 
Traveler Programs are voluntary and participants may have less possibility for an appeal, 
than they would in a government entitlement program since participation is guaranteed by 
statue (GAO, 2002, p.6)  
 However, many stakeholders expressed that Trusted Traveler Programs need to 
provide accurate data verification about travelers, function well in a commercial airport 
environment, and safeguard information against fraud (Chan et al., 2012). The concept of 
biometrics and its technologies is being used in Trusted Traveler Programs for those 
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under CBP, but TSA has not adopted the used of this technology in its commercial airport 
security screening procedures.  
The Concept of Biometrics and its Technologies  
 Government programs apply the concept of biometrics and its various 
technologies as a means for identifying and verifying of a person’s identity by analyzing 
and measuring an individual’s characteristics. The scientifically measurement of a 
person’s physiological characteristics produces a unique data that enables a biometric to 
clearly identify or verify an individual (NTSC, 2006a, p. 2).  
 The adoption of the use of biometrics for security and identification related 
matters are not uncommon in the private sector. The tourism and banking industry use 
this concept to control fraud and accessibility (Moroson, 2012). The U.S. government 
continues to look into the adoption and use of this technology for its Trusted Traveler 
Programs, but must be able to incorporate privacy provisions, as the law requires it 
(NTSC, 2006a, p.2).  
 The use of biometric technologies to measure and analyze an individual’s 
personal characteristics can come in various forms, measuring body parts such as the 
eyes, hand, fingerprints, and face (GAO, 2010, p.3). Acquisition devices such as 
recordings, cameras to take pictures, and scanning devices as known as biometric 
identification systems; that recognize patterns that are extracted, encoded, stored, and 
compared depending on the computer hardware and software capabilities (GAO, 2004, 
p.3).  
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 The process for biometric identification systems is usually automated and the 
decision-making process is fast within seconds. Based on the format of the system and its 
use, it can be for identification or verification purposes (GAO, 2002, p.3).  
Enrollment 
 In the enrollment process, the biometric system is specifically set to identify the 
identity of the person. For this to take place, the person must provide an identity card, 
which will act as an identifier (GAO, 2010, p.3). Afterwards, the system links the 
biometric to confirm the identity that is stored in the identification document.  
 Later, the individual places its unique biometric (ex: face, hand, fingerprints, or 
eye) in the acquisition device for identification (GAO, 2010, p.3). Those distinctive 
features are turned into samples which are taken, encrypted, and stored as future 
templates for comparisons in the future (GAO, 2010, p.3). If the identification document 
does not match a person’s real identity, the template that is used as a template will be 
connected to a false identity (GAO, 2004, p.4). 
 
Figure 6: CBP Trusted Traveler enrollment process 
 Depending on the technology, the biometric system extraction, encoding and 
storage information inside the template is exclusive to the vendor’s proprietary 
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algorithms (GAO, 2010, p.3). The same considerations are given to template sizes as 
templates can be stored remotely in a central database or inside a biometric reader device, 
such as smart cards and tokens (GAO, 2002, p.4). Specific factors such as changes in 
position, distance, pressure, and environment can change the template. Therefore, every 
time the biometric of an individual is taken, it is a unique template (p.4).  
 During the enrollment process, an individual may be asked to provide several 
samples of biometric data as part of the enrollment process, these samples are reference 
templates that are captured and stored for future comparisons (NSTC, 2006, p.3). The 
quality of the templates is important as it depends on the response of the biometric 
systems in order for it to accurately perform (NSTC, 2006, p.3). Since an individual’s 
biometric data over time can change, an individual will have to resubmit into the 
enrollment process to update their reference template, unless the technology being use 
updates itself during matching operations (GAO, 2004, p.4).   
Verification 
 After the enrollment process is verification. Verification is to verify that an 
individual is who they claim to be (ex: enrollee in the system) (GAO, 2010, p.4). Once 
the individual gives an identifier and the biometrics are collected, the biometric system 
process the biometrics, which generates a trial template according to the vendor’s 
algorithm (GAO, 2010, p.4). Afterwards, the system compares the trial biometrics with 
the person’s reference template already stored in the system and determines, if the 
individual’s trial and stored template match each other (GAO, 2002, p.8). 
31 
 
 Biometric systems that perform verification functions contain databases that range 
from dozens to millions of enrolled templates. There function is to always predict the 
matching of an individual’s biometric against his or hers reference template (GAO, 2002, 
p.8). Most verification systems render a match to no match result in less than a second 
and require employees to confirm their identities to gain access to secured computers and 
buildings (GAO, 2002, p.9).   
 
Figure 7: The biometric verification process 
Identification 
 An additional step after the enrollment process is identifying who the person is. 
Identification systems are different as no identifier is needed to provide a match (GAO, 
2010, p.8). In these systems, the captured biometric is compared with a stored template 
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alongside all of the individuals enrolled in the system with the anticipation that a match 
will be provided based on the search (GAO, 2010, p.8). 
  In positive identification systems, access to secure buildings and computers are 
conducted by cross-checking everyone in the database that all enrollees are enrolled in 
(GAO, 2002, p.10). The purpose of these systems is to find whether a person seeking 
access can be identified as being enrolled in the system (GAO, 2002, p.10). However, in 
negative identification systems, a person’s biometric information is not stored inside a 
database leading to a non-match result (GAO, 2002, p.10).  
 For example, the comparison of a person’s biometric information in a database of 
those that have registered in a public program can verify that a person may be “double 
dipping” with the use of fraudulent documents using multiple identities (GAO, 2002, 
p.10). A watch list system is an example of a negative identification system as it is 
designed to identify people who match the list and alert authorities for appropriate action. 
The system will check for those individuals that are not on the list and allowed them to 
travel (GAO, 2002, p. 10)  
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Figure 8: The biometric identification process 
 Individuals’ biometrics in the database of identification systems may have been 
placed in the system involuntarily. For example, in systems of surveillance, biometrics 
may be face captures from mug shots given by a law enforcement agency (GAO, 2013, 
p.12). For verification and identification systems, a no match is perfect since each time a 
biometric is taken; the template is different (GAO, 2013, p.12). As a result, biometric 
systems can be formatted to make a match or no-match decision on a number that has 
been preset and/or program threshold establishing a degree of acceptability between the 
captured template and the stored templates of those enrolled (NSTC, 2006b, pp.12-13). 
 Once the comparison is conducted, a score will be produced with the degree of 
acceptability and that score is than compared to the established threshold to make a 
decision (GAO, 2002, p.13). Depending on the setting of the threshold, it can have 
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several reference templates be considered matches to the trial template; resulting in better 
scores leading to better matches (GAO, 2002, p.13). The International Biometrics Group 
(IBG) considers four types of biometric identifiers to be effective for Trusted Traveler 
Programs especially for aviation security. These identifiers include fingerprint 
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, and facial recognition.  
Types of Biometric Technologies  
Fingerprint Recognition  
 This is the most commonly used and best-known technologies, as it is the easily 
acceptable among private industries. This technology extracts impressions made up of 
specific ridges in the fingertips. Fingerprints may be collected by rolling the finger or by 
placing it on a flat surface (Biometrics, 2010). A flat print collects the impression of the 
central area of the fingertip and the rolling print collects the ridges of the finger from both 
sides (Biometrics, 2010).   
 An image of the fingerprint is collected by a scanner, converted, and then 
enhanced, to become a template. Scanner technologies may be ultrasound, silicon, or 
optical (GAO, 2002, p.47). Ultrasound is considered the most accurate, but optical 
scanners are the ones commonly used.  During enhancement procedures, “noise” is a 
result of things such as scars, cuts, dirt, and creases, or worn fingerprints is reduced, 
making the ridges of the fingers more visible (GAO, 2002, p.47). About 80% of vendors 
format their proprietary algorithms on the collection of miniature points that relate to 
breaks in the ridges of the fingerprints, while others extract ridge patterns (GAO, 2002, 
p.47).     
35 
 
Iris Recognition  
 This technology centers on the color ring surrounding the pupil of the eye. The 
iris that is part of the eye is made of elastic connective tissue and is considered extremely 
rich in biometric data (GAO, 2002, p.47). The iris has 266 distinctive characteristics to 
include trabecular meshwork, rings, furrows, freckles and a corona allowing for extensive 
biometric data (GAO, 2002, p.47). Iris recognition utilizes a small, high-quality camera 
to collect a white and black, high-resolution picture of the iris and then selects the 
boundaries establishing a coordinate system over the iris. Afterwards, the specific zones 
are analyzed within that coordinate system (Biometrics, 2010). The iris tends to remain 
stable over the lifetime of the individual except if an injury would occur (GAO, 200, 
p.47).  
Hand Geometry   
 Hand Geometry utilizes an optical scanner that emits light-diodes with reflectors 
and mirrors capturing a three-dimensional image of the sides and back of the hand 
(Biometrics, 2010). Its purpose is to measure the width, length of fingers, joints, distance, 
between the joints, shapes of the knuckles, and height. These systems have been used for 
more than 10 years for access control at facilities from day care centers to nuclear power 
plants (Biometrics, 2010). This technology from its images can produce 96 measurements 
of extraction and as the shape of an individual’s hand remains the same over time, natural 
and environmental factors can result in changes (GAO, 2002, p.47).  
Facial Recognition  
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 Facial Recognition compares a live facial picture with a reference template and 
can be used to analyze static images as a digitized passport photos (Biometrics, 2010).  
This technology identifies an individual by areas of the face – the upper outlines of the 
eyes, cheekbones, and mouth. These types of systems can be used as identification and 
verification purposes.  Furthermore, since facial pictures can be captured from video 
cameras, facial recognition is the only biometric technology that can be used for 
surveillance purposes (Biometrics, 2010). Facial recognition depends on two algorithms: 
the Local Feature Analysis (LFA) and the Eigen Face method. The LFA breaks into 
pieces the face by the nose, eyes, mouth, and cheeks creating smaller size templates 
(GAO, 2002.p. 46). The Eigen Face method looks at the entire face using it at the set 
template (GAO, 2002, p. 46).  
Table 1  
Leading biometric technologies for aviation security  
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 There are other biometric technologies that are commonly used, but are not 
applied to aviation security such as:  
Retina Recognition  
 Retina Recognition collects and analyzes the blood vessels patterns from the thin 
nerve of the back of the eyeball from the light entering through the pupil (Biometrics, 
2010). Each eye has its unique pattern of blood vessels, each pattern stays stable 
throughout a person’s lifetime, but such diseases such as glaucoma, diabetes, high blood 
pressure, and autoimmune deficiency syndrome can affect it (Biometrics, 2010). In retina 
recognition, the individual has to place the eye closely to the lens of the scanning device 
and remain completely still while focusing on a revolving light while a small camera 
scans the retina through the pupil, since the retina is small and can be difficult to 
measure, the collection of its image makes it hard in relation to other biometric 
technologies (GAO, 2002, p.48).     
 This technology the most reliable and accurate of the technologies currently used, 
but any slight movement can interfere with the collection process and restarting can cause 
time during the enrollment and verification process. At the moment, government and 
military environments use this technology for access control requiring very high security 
levels such research sites and nuclear weapons locations levels (GAO, 2002, p.48). 
However, as a result of the high degree of cooperation and effort required of its users, it 
is also one of the least deployable technologies in terms of biometrics (GAO, 2002, p.48).  
Signature Recognition 
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  Signature Recognition confirms the identity of the individual by the measurement 
of signatures that are hand written. Then, the signature through a series of movements is 
analyzed to reflect an individual’s rhythm, pressure flow, and acceleration (GAO, 2002, 
p.48). Electronic signature captures the signature and treats it as a graphic image compare 
to signature recognition in which measures how a signature is signed (GAO, 2002, p.48).  
 In signature recognition, the capture consists of the individual signing his or her 
signature on a digitized personal assistant or graphic tablet. Then, the system will analyze 
the signature based on the dynamics of stroke count, pressure, speed, and stroke order, as 
well as, track an individual’s natural signature fluctuations over time (GAO, 2002, p.49). 
Speaker Recognition  
 Speaker Recognition uses the individual’s sound of voice combine with 
differences in physiological as in learned speaking habits and the shape of vocal tracts 
(Biometrics, 2010). In the enrollment process, this technology captures samples of 
individual’s speech by having him or her speak predetermined information into a 
telephone number or a microphone several times to capture the template (Biometrics, 
2010).  
 The predetermined information can be a name, birth month, birth city, a sequence 
of numbers, or a favorite color. Afterwards, that information is change from analog to 
digital format and the distinctive vocal characteristics such as cadence, tone, and pitch are 
collected and a model of the speaker is composed (Biometrics, 2010). Then, a template is 
developed and saved for future matching. This technology can be used to verify and 
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identify a person’s identity, however, the biometric identifier is through telephone or call 
centers (GAO, 2002, p.49).  
Table 2  
Leading biometrics technologies and their template size  
 
Emerging Biometric Technologies  
 New biometric technologies are under development to recognize behavioral and 
physiological characteristics. Some of these technologies are commercially available 
while others still have years from implementation (Biometrics, 2010). Each technologies 
technique’s performance can change, depending on how it is used and the environment 
where is being used (Biometrics, 2010).  
Vein Scan   
 This biometric technology automatically identifies a person from the patterns of 
the blood vessels in the back of the hand. It uses near-infrared light to detect vein vessel 
patterns (GAO, 2002, p. 50). Vein patterns are different between twins and even between 
a person’s right and left hand. This technology is highly stable and robust, and the vein 
pattern only changes throughout a person’s lifetime in size. It is not intrusive and works 
on the hand even if it is not clean (GAO, 2002, p. 50).  
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Facial Thermography  
 Facial Thermography detects patterns of heat created by the branching of blood 
vessels emitted from the skin. The patterns name thermo grams are highly distinctive that 
identical twins have different ones.  Facial thermography works much like facial 
recognition, except that infrared cameras are used to capture the images (GAO, 2002, 
p.50).  
 This technology is not intrusive and no physical contact is required, as every 
person can present a usable image that can be collected in an instant. In addition, infrared 
systems work in dim light or in total darkness. The problem with this technology is that 
the manufacturing costs of the system are extremely expensive (Biometrics, 2010).  
DNA Matching  
 Is a biometric technology that uses physiological traits for personal identification, 
it is considered the ultimate technology as it can produce a proof positive identification of 
a person, except for identical twins (GAO, 2002, p.51). The difference between DNA 
matching from standard biometrics is that it compares actual samples rather than 
templates generated by samples.  
 In addition, DNA comparisons cannot be automated and so comparisons cannot 
be made in real time. This technology is only use for identification in forensic 
applications and it has many years for its implementation as its extremely intrusive 
(GAO, 2002, p.51).     
Odor Sensing 
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  Odor sensing is the measuring of body odor. This technology would allow the 
use of an odor-sensing instrument to capture the volatile chemicals that the skin pores all 
over the body as it emits an individual’s smell (GAO, 2002, p.51). The development of 
this type of technology is complex as odor can change based on an individual’s diet, 
medications, perfumes, and deodorants (GAO, 2002, p.51).  
Blood Pulse Measurement 
  Blood Pulse Measurement is the technology that measures the blood pulse on a 
finger with infrared sensors. This technology is in its experimental stages and has a high 
false match rate, which is impractical for personal identification purposes (Biometrics, 
2010).  
Skin Pattern Recognition 
  Skin Pattern Recognition measures the characteristic spectrum of an individual’s 
skin. Each individual’s skin is different as it relates to thickness and the interfaces 
between the layers that have various pigmentation, undulations, collagen fibers, and 
proteins changes in the density beneath the skin (GAO, 2002, p. 51). This technology 
uses a light sensor that lights up a small patch with a beam of visible and near-infrared 
light and then measures with a spectroscope after being scattered by the skin (GAO, 
2002, p.51). Afterwards, the measurements are analyzed and an optical pattern is 
extracted (GAO, 2002, p.51).   
Nailbed Identification 
  Nailbed Identification is the identification of the distinct tongue-in-grove spatial 
arrangement of the epidermal structure directly under the fingernail. An interferometer is 
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used to detect phase changes in back-scattered light shone on the fingernail and once the 
distinctive dimensions are reconstructed, a map is generated (GAO, 2002, p. 51).  
Gait Recognition 
 Gait recognition is based on the concept of recognizing individuals by their walk. 
An individual’s gait may be difficult to hide since an individual’s musculature prevents 
the variation of movement and needs contact with that individual. This technology would 
capture a pattern of pictures to analyze the characteristics based on movement (GAO, 
2002, p.52). Experimental results have confirmed that there is potential for this 
technology and further testing is needed to determine advantages, limitations, and 
performance (GAO, 2002, p.52).   
Ear Shape Recognition 
  Ear Shape Recognition is currently under development and it is the concept of 
measuring and analyzing the specific shape and size of each individual’s ears and its 
structure is based on the cartilaginous part of the outer ear. There are no commercial 
systems available for this presently (GAO, 2002, p.52).    
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Table 3 
 Emerging Biometric Technologies and Their Maturity 
 
Accuracy of Biometric Technologies  
 The accuracy of biometric technologies is based on three key performance metrics 
the False Match Rate (FMR), False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and the Failure to Enroll 
Rate (FTER) (GAO, 2004, p.11). 
 The false match rate happens when a biometric system matches incorrectly an 
identity, and that the individuals have been wrongly matched (GAO, 2004, p.11). In 
positive identification and verification system, unauthorized people may be granted 
access to resources and facilities because of incorrect matches. In negative identification 
systems, the result of a false match can be to deny access (GAO, 2004, p.11). For 
example, an applicant may be denied access to benefits to a government benefits 
program, if it is falsely matched to a person that has previously enrolled in the program 
and is registered under a different identity (GAO, 2004, p.11).   
 The false non-match rate happens when a biometric system rejects a valid identity 
and is the probability of valid individuals being wrongly not matched (GAO, 2004, p.11). 
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In positive identification and verification systems, people can be denied access to 
resources and facilities as the system may fail to make a correct match (GAO, 2004, 
p.11). In negative identification systems, a false non-match can grant access to resources 
that should be denied to the individual. For example, if an applicant has enrolled in a 
government benefits program under another identity and is not matched correctly, he or 
she will gain access to benefits (GAO, 2004, p.11).  
 The high similarity between two individuals’ traits can produce false matches; 
while having a low similarity between two individuals during enrollment can be affected 
by various conditions is what causes false non-matches. It is important to consider that an 
individual’s biometric data will change through time based on aging and sometimes 
injuries (Biometrics, 2010). If both the error rates are zero, it would make the biometric 
system perfect, but biometric systems cannot identify individuals by 100 percent 
accuracy and therefore a trade-off has to exist within the two (GAO, 2004, p.11).  
 False non-match and false match are related as they must be assessed towards the 
levels of risk that are acceptable. These risk levels must be balanced with the limitations 
of inconvenience (GAO, 2004, p.11). For example, in access control environments, 
perfect security would require denying access to everyone and granting access to 
everyone would result in denying access to no one. Neither extreme is reasonable, and 
biometric systems must operate somewhere between the two (GAO, 2004, p.11).  
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Figure 9: The relationship between FMR and FNMR 
 An additional metric is derived from false match rate and false non-match rates 
that vendors used as the equal error rate to demonstrate the accuracy of their biometric 
systems. The equal error rate is the point where the false match rate equals the false non-
match rate (GAO, 2004, p.15). When a biometric system is at a threshold that is at its 
equal error rate; an individual that is falsely matched, is the same as an individual that is 
falsely non-matched (GAO, 2004, p.15). However, this statistic explanation tends to over 
simplify the balance between the false match rate and the false non-match rate because in 
the real world, few applications the need for security is identical to the need for 
convenience (GAO, 2004, p.15).  
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 The failure to enroll rate measures the probability that an individual will be 
unable to enroll. This may come from not having a unique biometric sample or the 
system design makes it hard for an individual to give biometric data (GAO, 2004, p.15). 
For example, the people who work manual labor extensively, their fingerprints are too 
worn to be captured and in retina recognition systems a high number of individuals are 
unable to enroll because of the precision it requires (Biometrics, 2010). 
  Furthermore, people who cannot speak are unable to use voice recognition 
systems and people without fingers or hands from injuries, congenital disease, and 
surgery amputation cannot use hand geometry and fingerprint systems (Biometrics, 
2010). 1 and 3 percent of the population cannot use any one biometric system as they do 
not have the required body part needed; and so are not counted into the system’s failure 
to enroll rate (GAO, 2004, p.15). 
  In order to meet performance requirements, vendors of biometrics systems are 
incorporating two or more biometrics systems, as one biometric capture system may have 
high failure to enroll rates (Biometrics, 2010). Depending on how the biometric system is 
programmed, it can operate for either identification or identification purposes. Recent 
studies have demonstrated through experimental results that the identities established by 
systems that incorporate more than one biometric are more reliable, can be applied to 
large target populations, and improve response times (Biometrics, 2010).  
Criticisms of Biometrics  
47 
 
 Besides the important benefits over security measures that biometric technologies 
may provide, there are issues and concerns. Government agencies and organizations 
realize the significant advantages that biometric technologies have in improving and 
monitoring identity identification and verification, yet, a major concern is tracking and 
data management (Bocozk, Buster, Fitzgerald et al, 2005). According to the International 
Biometrics Group (2008) the most negative part of biometric identification systems is 
their ability to locate and track people. Many surveillance systems seem to track and 
locate people and biometric systems are used because of their high level of accuracy 
(p.4).  
The loss of privacy is another serious concern surrounding the use of biometrics 
(Archarya, 2006; Baird, 2002; Cavoukian 1999; European Commission, 2005; Jain, Ross, 
& Prabhkar, 2004). The global implementation of the use of biometric systems has 
increased and the concern for privacy and an individual’s right to that privacy have 
increased as well. “In the United States, the freedom of the individual is perceived to be 
closely related to his or her ability to operate somewhat autonomously and anonymously 
in the eyes of the states, as well as, other organizations that collect data from individuals 
without permission” (Woodward, Webb, Newton, Bradley, & Rubenson, 2001, p.22).  
According to Cavoukian (1999) privacy is what an individual does in their own 
space and whom they choose to interact “with trust, sense of freedom and openness, or 
with distrust, sense of insecurity and fear” (p.29). Furthermore, an individual’s interest 
and autonomy usually will rise when the person feels like their privacy is threatened by 
others (NSTC, 2006d). According to privacy rights advocates, biometric technology will 
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violate the individual’s right to privacy and invade confidentiality (Vollmer, 2006). A 
biometric per say is not considered good or bad, it depends on how the biometric system 
is designed, developed, and implemented (Pilgrim, 2007). The biometric industry and 
organizations are apprehensive about privacy, as it a significant problem in regards to the 
collection of personal information (ANSI, 2005).  
The majority of apprehensions related to privacy are based on the rights of the 
individual, data mining, and the managing of biometric data by an organization (Allan, 
2002). Discussions related to privacy concerns focused on individuals, as they do not 
have power over the managing of their personal data that could easily be misused and 
abused (Allan, 2002). The different forms of privacy by Tiresias (2008) are:  
 Privacy protective: Is a system used to limit access or protect personal 
information providing a form for the individual can established a trusted identity.  
 Privacy sympathetic: Is a system that limits the access and the usage of personal 
data by making decision by design related towards the transmission and storage of 
biometric data.  
 Privacy neutral: Is a system where privacy is not an issue and its potential impact 
to privacy is light. These systems are hard to misuse from a privacy point of view 
as it does not protect personal privacy.  
 Privacy invasive: Is a system that enables and facilitates the use of personal data 
in an unstructured matter allowing for privacy principles acceptance (p.8). 
 Privacy rights advocates do not accept the use of biometrics and other forms of 
verification for capturing information about individuals for the fear of having a 
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“surveillance society or police state” where private companies and governments collect 
large quantities of personal information without justification (Archarya, 2005, p.8). 
Therefore, the adoption of biometrics becomes an issue of physical privacy, creating 
greater anxiety of state watching in the blanket term for national security (Archarya, 
2005; ANSI, 2005; Rand, 2001; Woodward et al., 2001).  
 In addition, the elevation of the trepidation of physical privacy can lead to 
stigmatization, hygiene, and actual harm (ANSI, 2005; Woodward et al., 2001). 
Additionally, the disapproval of biometric technology is the function creep. The term 
function creep refers to data collected for one reason and then is used for another 
unintended purpose without justification and to take advantage of the authorization of 
data subjects (Archarya, 2005). According to Tiresias (2008) function creeps are a direct 
violation of privacy principles.   
The use of the Social Security Number (SSN) is an example of the function creep 
in the society of the United States. The original social security cards had the label “Not 
for Identification”, then, by 1961, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began using social 
security numbers for purposes of tax identification (Lease, 2005, p.57). In 2002, 
employment, credit, insurance transactions, and state driver’s licenses require the social 
security number, even though it is not needed to complete the transaction (Lease, 2005, 
p.57). Furthermore, a controversial concern surrounding the use of biometrics is data 
catalogued though the collection of personal information. Data catalogued is a reduction 
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of the individual unique identifiers in association with committed crimes (Watkins, 
2007).   
Biometric data is not easy to modify as once the digital identifier is compromised, 
it cannot be used for identification and verification into the records of the system’s 
database (Watkins, 2007). Under the use of this technology, automatic recognition is 
controversial because its purpose is to have human errors prevented. However, when the 
system does not respond properly, there is no one to correct those mistakes and that 
becomes the cost for implementing such technology (Watkins, 2007).  
 Another concern for the resistance of biometric technology is health and hygiene. 
Users of the technology may experience anxiety based on the cleanliness of the sensors 
used to collect data from irises, fingerprints, and facial scans (Bocozk et al, 2005). 
Presently, there are no studies demonstrating of any health concerns associated with the 
use of biometrics. However, the idea may produce fear in users or discourage them from 
enrolling or accepting the verification process of biometric technologies (Bocozk et al, 
2005).  
 Those health concerns would have to be investigated by health professionals, 
subject matter experts and vendors of biometric technologies. The religious concern 
towards the use of biometric technology can come from societal emphasis and legal 
opinions as respect to religious beliefs (Bocozk et al, 2005).   
 Besides all of the concerns regarding the use of biometric technologies, Lease 
(2005) stated, “supporters of biometric authentication systems argued that properly 
deployed and equipped with adequate best practice controls, biometric systems can 
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actually function to enhance and protect privacy” (p.57).  Experts in biometric technology 
stated that the potential for this technology is tremendous, but the need for privacy 
principles and the ability to protect users from unauthorized intrusion is important 
(Cavoukian, 1999).  
 As the government continues to adopt and implement this technology quickly, the 
right to privacy of the individual is being threatened (Vollmer, 2006). The government 
must implement safeguards that need to be incorporated into the technology, so that the 
individual’s intrusion of privacy is minimal and public safety and protection are 
maximized (Vollmer, 2006). The bottom line is that the system’s design, deployment, 
personnel training, and use must have protections for personal privacy (Lease, 2005). 
 Privacy provisions are not subject to just government institutions, businesses need 
to accept responsibility for protecting consumer data and their privacy. According to 
Cavoukain (1999) the use of biometric information must balance effectively and 
appropriately a customer’s right to privacy and must be for legitimate business purposes 
as organizations should deployed and adopt requirements for the promotion of fair 
information practices (p.44). The purpose of fair information requirements and practices 
is to reduce and avoid unauthorized data collection that is unreasonable, unnecessary, and 
unauthorized use, and disclosures (Cavoukian, 1999). 
Biometric application through the privacy enhancing of privacy technologies 
(PETs) is a solution offered by ANSI (2005).  PETs are systems of information and 
communication technology (ICT) measuring privacy protection through the reduction and 
elimination of personal data and through the prevention of undesired processing without 
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losing the functionality of the data system (ANSI, 2005). Privacy watchdogs have already 
protested the use of biometrics to verify and identify individuals, but it is important to 
incorporate safeguards and privacy principles in the protection of an individual’s security 
and to lessen the compromise of consumer data (ANSI, 2005). By implementing those 
items, individuals have the peace of mind that their information is secured and controlled; 
and not sold to third-party vendors (Nwatu, 2011). Organizations will be trusted more by 
the public if their systems and data are viewed as protecting privacy and enhancing 
security (Nwatu, 2011).   
Technology Acceptance Model by Davis (1989) 
The incorporation of any biometric system in any government program cannot 
neglect the TAM model and its usage on how large populations may perceive the use of 
recent technologies. Davis (1989) model provided a valid and reliable measure that 
predicts the acceptance or adoption of new technologies by end-users and is used to 
measure technology acceptance (King & He, 2006). 
 According to Liu and Silverman (2001) several factors affect the adoption and 
acceptance of biometric systems to include accuracy, costs, user acceptance, error 
incidence, required security level, and long-term stability affect in whether a biometric 
system will be deployed or not. Additionally, Rajchel (2007) stated “that the lifestyle of 
the system, invasiveness, hygiene and health, religion, culture and ethics would affect 
implementation”. Table 4 illustrates the different factors impacting the adoption of 
biometric technologies (Liu & Silverman, 2001). The TAM plays an important part in the 
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implementation toward the adoption of biometric systems and although, the authors of 
the model may have various viewpoints, analyzing the need to make the decision to 
adopt, is based on financial resources, the type of biometric technology to use and the 
availability of experienced personnel.  
Table 4 
Comparison of Factors Influencing Biometrics Adoption 
 
54 
 
 The TAM is the theoretical framework that allows for the understanding of how 
perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness will influence an individual’s behavior 
and attitudes towards the adoption of the use of the technology being implemented 
(Klopping & McKinney, 2004; Nqugi, 2005; Wahid, 2007). When understanding the 
various factors that will affect the implementation of technological systems, the model 
enables the improvement of the system’s design, deployment and adoption strategies, and 
user acceptance (Shen, Laffey, Lin & Huang, 2006). The literature related to this model 
has been receptive and popular as it continues to be used to clarify the various influences 
that can determine the acceptance of technology in organizational environments 
(Mahinda & Whitworth, 2005).  
The model uses the factors of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use in 
order to determine the possible technology adoption, acceptance, and usage (Shen, 
Laffey, Lin, & Huang, 2006). The author of the model concluded that perceived 
usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) affected attitudes and behavioral 
reactions toward the usage of technologies such as biometrics (Shen et al., 2006). For 
example, individuals using the technology may believe that it will be useful, easy to use, 
and reliable in identifying people and an enhancement to their personal security (Shen et 
al., 2006).   
These beliefs would generate attitude or behavioral reactions furthering an interest 
in the use of the technology. Furthermore, if users believed that the system is complex 
and does not have reliable performance, then the behaviors toward the system will be 
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negative impacting the adoption of the technology. External variables such as the 
characteristics of the system’s design, available training, interest, awareness, and 
documentation will heavily impact the usage of the technology (Wahid, 2007). 
 Biometric technology vendors find it hard to incorporate the model operationally 
as it goes under the implementation level (Ngugi, 2005). As the model has been 
employed to describe factors that will influence the adoption, the model becomes 
deficient in reliability, flexibility, and extendibility (Mahinda &Whitworth, 2005). 
Furthermore, the model is criticized for being incomplete as it does not include other 
variables that impact the adoption such as privacy, security, and trust (Brydie, 2008; 
Josua & Koshy 2009, Shen et al., 2006).  
In a study conducted by Joshua and Koshy (2009) it concluded that perceived 
ease of use and security helped determine the attitudes toward the acceptance of 
technological systems. Afterwards, Kim (2006) realized that physical security was a 
variable that affected the acceptance of the system by hotel guests; and that reliability and 
trust were also reasons for adoption (Brydie, 2008). The studies conducted that the 
acknowledgment of these variables would affect the implementation of the technological 
systems, by improving the design, deployment and adoption strategies to gain user 
acceptance (Wahid, 2007). 
 The model in Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between ease of use, 
usefulness, and external variables such as those of security, privacy, and trust towards 
attitude formation toward the acceptance of biometric technologies (Joshua & Koshy, 
56 
 
2009). According to Joshua & Koshy (2009), “the original model that Davis (1989) 
developed did not include security as a variable. Over the years, researchers argued that 
other factors would affect the attitudes and behavioral reactions to use technology besides 
perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness” (Cowen, 2009, Joshua & Koshy, 2009, 
Jahagir & Begum, 2008; Shen, Laffey, Lin & Huang, 2006).  
Ease of Use  
 Is the extent that an individual would accept at no cost using a method (Jahangir 
& Begum, 2008; Joshua & Koshy, 2009). According to Jahangir and Begum (2008), 
“perceived ease of use is the user’s awareness that the use of biometrics will be of 
minimal effort, if an individual understands the technology, it leads to adoption and this 
is important as it would generate positive attitudes towards acceptance of the system” 
(p.34).  
Perceived Usefulness 
 Refers to an individual’s perception of the outcome of the experience when using 
a new piece of technology (Jahangir & Begum, 2008). If an individual believes that 
biometric systems are helpful and effective to protect individual security, and privacy, 
they will likely accept its use. However, if the individual does not realize the usefulness, 
it will also affect the adoption (Jahangir & Begum, 2008; Joshua & Koshy, 2009). 
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Figure 10: Davis (1989) technology acceptance model 
Security 
 Is the need for preventative measures and identity protection towards unnecessary 
risks (Jahangir & Begum, 2008). When users perceived that there is reliability and 
security in the use of the technology, their attitudes towards the technology would be 
positive (Jahangir & Begum, 2008). Moreover, the sense of loss of safety and 
unreliability of the system would increase attitudes towards the system to be negative.  
Awareness 
 The level of awareness of the technology would impact its implementation as well 
as a person’s age (Asfaw, 2006; Norris, 2001). Various factors would add an important 
role in the adoption, implementation, and usability of biometric technologies.  
 Awareness of the benefits and effects of the technology to incorporate identity 
management and fight against identity fraud.  
 Awareness of accessibility and availability, and  
 Awareness of the daily use of biometrics as a part of life.   
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The issue of implementation is determined by various factors that could impact 
the acceptance in the long-term as it could bring change in attitudes and behaviors. High 
levels of awareness may not always impact the adoption and usability of biometrics, but 
it is a factor that should be considered in its adoption and implementation strategies 
(Asfaw, 2006; Norris, 2001).   
Attitude 
  According to Alrafi (2005) behaviors could be negative or positive and the way 
an individual perceives that experience it what gives such attitude. Attitude is the 
individual’s society, as he or she believes it to be.  Behaviors determined an implicit 
response that is:  
1. Considered significant in the individual’s society,  
2. Based on patterns learned through discrimination and generalization,  
3. Self-cueing and drive-producing, and,  
4. Anticipatory and mediating in reference to patterns of overt responses (p.4).   
If an individual has a positive attitude towards the technology, it is most likely to 
approve and accept it as a part of life. However, a disapproving feeling would lead to a 
negative mindset towards any biometric system based on their perceived ease of use, 
perceived usefulness, awareness, security, privacy, and level of interest of the individual 
(Joshua & Koshy, 2009; Jahangir & Begum, 2008).  
Past research suggested that individuals are not likely to perceive information 
practices as invasive to privacy when (1) the information used or collected is related to a 
transaction and (2) the information they believe would be used to draw reliable and valid 
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inferences about them (Baker, 1991; Clarke, 1988; Stone & Stone, 1990; Stone et al., 
1983; Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982). As privacy is considered to be the 
most highly prized rights, it becomes secondary when it comes to threats of physical 
harm and street crimes (Vidmar & Flaherty, 1985, as cited in Katz & Tassone, 1990). 
 In the use of Davis (1989) TAM Model, biometrics is an information technology 
tool that would have to incorporate cultural, gender and demographic differences, as well 
as, social influence and attitudes towards technology; in order to see if the target 
population would accept or reject the use of biometric devices (Malhotra & Galletta, 
1999).  Moreover, the current research points out that understanding specifically who the 
user is can have an important influence on the technology’s acceptability to that user, in 
this case, it would be the Trusted Traveler who voluntarily participates in the program.  
 Additionally, the effects of the change in behaviors and attitudes is described in 
the Cognitive Dissonance Theory, where the use of a product may change one’s 
perceptions, attitudes, and needs when the product has been used. For example, a 
frequent flyer may experience various trip conditions such as the commute to the airport, 
airline check-in, security screening, and gate boarding differently versus a non-frequent 
flyer (Pranic, Roehl, &West, 2008). However, the introduction of a new experience may 
change the common knowledge of the frequent flyer that could result in altering the 
perceptions of the frequent flyer into accepting the new security procedures (Pranic, 
Roehl, &West, 2008).  
The Concept of Privacy 
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 According to Warren and Brandeis (1890) “Privacy” is the claim that an 
individual interest usually arises as an assertion against other individuals or organizations 
to prevent interference from the individual’s autonomy. It is the desire of each individual 
for physical space, as he or she can be free of interruption, intrusion, embarrassment, and 
accountability; it is the attempt to control the manner of disclosures of personal 
information” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).   
 The birthplace of privacy in the United States comes from the article “The Right 
to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890) which provided the example of 
the conceptual transition from physical place to information space. For instance, in the 
last fifty years, the Supreme Court used the right to privacy to protect the right to 
purchase and use contraceptives, the right to have an abortion, and the right to engage in 
private and consensual homosexual activity (Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 644).  
 However, the main concern of Warren and Brandeis was with the media that was 
interested in gossip and revealing personal things about individuals without their consent 
(Chemerinsky, 2006, p.644).  For example, Warren and Brandeis (1890) stated that 
“photography is an information technology that enabled the collection of information 
about an individual independent of his or her actual control; creating the capability to use 
the collected information for any purpose without further involvement or agreement from 
the individual” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).   
As of current date, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated or protected the 
right to informational privacy. In his article in 1960, William Prosser described how 
privacy came to be established in tort law and the various torts that fit within to include 
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torts for intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and placing a person in a false light 
(Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 645). Privacy is about freedom from government intrusion into 
an individual’s home or to an individual’s person.  
Brandeis made an argument that the Fourth Amendment should apply because 
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their conversations and the 
unjustified intrusion by the government is a means of infringing on this expectation and 
deem a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).  Privacy is used 
in constitutional law to protect aspects of autonomy in which the person has the right to 
make certain crucial personal decisions. 
The present concern is on data aggregation, electronic surveillance, identity theft, 
identity management, biometrics, warehousing and breaches. The Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) concern led to specific questions in the field of privacy and to the legal aspects in 
U.S. Society such as: (1) “What effect should privacy protection have on technology?” 
(2) “What is the appropriate use of personal information?” and (3) “Should personal 
information be collected and for what particular purpose or application?”  
The National Science & Technology Council (NSTC) broke down the complex 
term of privacy to make it relevant to the technological advances to today’s society.  
Decisional  
Concerns related to a person’s authority to make life decisions that  affect the 
person’s life and body and those of the person’s family members in end of life issues 
(NSTC, 2006d).  
Spatial 
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Concerns related to physical spaces to include a person’s bedroom, home, car, etc. 
These issues usually concentrate on the authority of the person to decide who may enter 
or observe the items and activities that happen in that specific place (NSTC, 2006d).  
Intentional 
 Concerns related to characteristics that are publicly visible or intimate activities. 
These concerns concentrate on the authority that the person has to bar further 
communication of an observable feature or event (NSTC, 2006d).Examples are claims 
against conversations being repeated that happen in public and the publishing of 
photographs without authorization and unintended nudity (NSTC, 2006d).  
Informational 
Concerns related to the use of information that pertains to the person. Issues 
usually concentrate on the extent of the person’s authority to control how that 
information is used (by whom and for what purpose) and the responsibility of the 
corresponding individuals and organizations to include the person in the decision-making 
process that would drive the subsequent use (NTSC, 2006d).  
The concept of informational would apply to the adoption of biometrics into 
Trusted Traveler programs as the main focus would be that government organizations 
would use the biometric data and convert it into electronic data and then make a decision 
for individuals to be able to access expedited screening. This is the reason why privacy 
assessments must be made before adoption and implementation of biometric systems 
(Solove, Rotenburg & Schwartz, 2006).  
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The term “privacy” is not in the text of the United States Constitution, but the 
living document does have provisions that incorporate privacy protection. Those 
provisions are in the First Amendment, protecting against the disclosure of group 
membership (National Archives, 2013). The Third Amendment protects an individual’s 
home from government intrusion (National Archives, 2013). The Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches of personal spaces, possessions, and body from 
the government (National Archives, 2013). Last, the Fifth Amendment is the protection 
against forced disclosure of self-information (National Archives, 2013).  
For instance, the Fourth Amendment main focus is on unreasonable search and 
seizures, which includes a review of the expectation of privacy for the individual 
(National Archives, 2013). The individual must have an actual expectation of privacy and 
that expectation must be reasonable in the given circumstances (Solove, Rotenburg & 
Schwartz, 2006). For example, biometric systems must considered and inform the 
individual of the development, operation, and its implementation (Morosan, 2012). 
Just like the privacy provisions in the U.S. Constitution, Privacy Torts are 
additional sources of privacy protection. In civil law, torts are civil injuries that an 
individual could be compensated. There is a possibility that an individual could file a 
claim related to the use of biometric data, at which point the details of what does or does 
not qualify, and the measure of the injury would become the focus (Prosser, 1960). 
According to Prosser (1960), these privacy torts are categorized as “(1) Interfering with 
an individual’s private affairs, (2) Sharing embarrassing information about the individual, 
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and (3) Using someone’s name or image for personal gain”(Richards & Solove, 2010, 
p.9).  
As the U.S. Constitution has privacy provisions, states laws have also been in 
place to protect the individual’s right to privacy extending those of federal jurisdictions. 
As a result, each biometric system that is use exists only within the legal jurisdiction of 
the tribal, local, state, and federal laws (NSTC, 2006d). Therefore, the laws of each place 
must be reviewed and incorporated into the strategy and design of the biometric system in 
order to operate and be administrated in (NSTC, 2006d).   
The legal jurisdiction to biometric systems does not just extend to those in the 
United States, but also into international governments. International agreements with the 
European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) created 
frameworks in the sharing of fair privacy principles when dealing with personal 
information (NSTC, 2006d).  The framework encourages participation of the individual 
granting them the right to know what is the personal information being collected, the 
right to request a copy of the information, and the right to appeal the accuracy of the data 
including the chance to have it erased (NSTC, 2006c.) 
In the case of the adoption of biometrics into Trusted Traveler programs for the 
use of expedited security screening, it would exist in multiple jurisdictions within the 
United States and would cross international boundaries (NSTC, 2006c.) International 
connections would exist through the physical equipment used by the system, the 
information in the system, the individuals using the system, and the individuals’ 
information in the system (NSTC, 2006c)  
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The real concern relating to the privacy of information is its ability to connect to 
the interest of the individual. This connection is personal information as any information 
could be used to identify the individual in any way. Not all data may look like personal 
information, but can be through its use (Commerce, 2000). For example, if data is use in 
combination with other data and results in the identification of the individual either 
intentional or unintentional the data becomes personal information and privacy issues 
become a concern (NTSC, 2006d).  
The privacy impact of combining data for the purpose of identifying individuals’ 
reaches to the point; to the intent to identify is the reason biometric information justifies 
as personal information through its content and its use (GAO, 2010, p. 21). Where there 
is the use of biometric information, there is personal information involved and privacy 
concerns need to be addressed to determine the impact of the use of the data, and how it 
relates to the individual’s privacy interests (NSTC, 2006). 
Legal Authority and Privacy Provisions 
The law and the legitimate public policy that governs biometric systems must be 
clearly articulated, previously disclosed, and related to its original purpose. The 
collection and use of personal information is based on a legal authority through an 
agreement or law.  An individual decides to participate in a system or program based on 
the individual understanding of what he or she is giving and what he or she is getting in 
return (NTSC, 2006c). 
According to Moroson (2012): 
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“The privacy assessment of a biometric system should explain the context and 
authority to the user. It should further explain the original collection of biometric 
information and illustrate that all system functions; including information sharing, 
the grounds to its legal authority and the details are articulated and available to the 
individual, before personal information is collected” (p.440 ). 
The use of biometric systems could be modified through time and privacy 
protections must be applied. The most important privacy consideration to keep is the 
ongoing management of biometric systems on the bases of information privacy.  Private 
industries have different requirements for the use of biometric systems, in regards to 
medical, financial, and minor children. However, government institutions have three laws 
that must be incorporated in their protocols (Morosan, 2012).   
The collection and use of personal information by the government is controlled 
under (a) The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, which provides access to any 
government record to anyone for any purpose with the exception to include the protection 
of personal privacy, (b) The Privacy Act of 1974 that has a set of fair information 
principles to govern the government’s collection, use, and maintenance of PII contained 
in a system of records; and (c) The Government Act of 2002 which requires government 
agencies to conduct assessments of the use of information technology and its potential 
impact that use could have on privacy (Nelson, 2004). 
 It is essential to understand the individual’s concern towards privacy protection, 
as it is threatened, especially when information used by the system is based on health, 
financial status, or used by the government for other means that are clearly not disclosed 
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(Neyland, 2009, pp.135-136). The biometric system must be clear in its design and 
implementation strategies to address the concerns of the individual and illustrate that the 
information collected would be used only for such functions and nothing else, preventing 
the function creep (NSTC, 2006a).   
Privacy advocates argued that these national databases would operate on a 
presumption of accuracy, but who would be responsible for those amendments, costs, and 
the process it would involve. Furthermore, privacy advocates suggest that the national ID 
scheme offers the chance for favored companies to win lucrative government contracts 
expanding their self-interests (Neyland, 2009, pp. 145).  
Nevertheless, misidentification, problems with confirming identification, and 
others using or manipulating identity information, could lead to problems for a broader 
constituency (Neyland, 2009, pp. 145).  Therefore, the politics built into the technology 
include inclusion boundaries (good to almost everyone) and exclusion boundaries (those 
to be targeted), would be depended on the terms of “feasible” and “reasonable” 
arguments that would depend on the ability to successfully manage these boundaries 
(Neyland, 2009, pp. 145) 
 According to Neyland (2009), National ID policies such as those of the Real ID 
Act of 2005 involve claims regarding the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale 
databases, connecting each other with regards to millions of people. The advantages in 
using biometrics under National ID policies are (a) fights against illegal working by 
preventing employers from employing staff without having the proper documentation, (b) 
prevent immigration abuse by making the country less attractive for asylum seekers, (c) 
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prevent the use of false and multiple identities’ by terrorists and criminals, (d) ensures 
that free public services are only used by those entitled to them, preventing the abuse of 
health tourism, and (e) help to protect people from identity theft where victims have their 
identities stolen by others who may use the identity for financial or some other gain 
(Neyland, 2009, pp 15-16).  
 However, Neyland (2009) mentioned the disadvantages on posing set policies on 
the use of biometrics based on organizations against National ID policies, as these 
National IDs are unreasonable, unnecessary, and technology is not feasible. Those claims 
are based on the following arguments: (a) terrorism is not based on issues of identity, but 
tied to various political situations around the world, (b) benefit fraud is committed 
through the under or lack of reporting of income (not identity) and, (c) identity theft may 
increase through the ID card scheme with criminals, by registering their own biometrics 
under another name and gaining access to computer records (Neyland, 2009, p.15-16). 
 Nevertheless, Neyland (2009) suggested that a series of privacy concerns are 
subject to the flexibility of the interpretation of legislation. Therefore, depending on the 
interpretation, governments would use the technology for (a) impose fines and 
imprisonment for failure to enroll or obtain a national ID, (b) decide to share information 
with third parties, (c) limit powers to protect the population, (d) not all interpretation of 
legislation would fit international organization compliance requirements, and (e) cards 
with chips would produce audit trails that are not clear for what and who it would be 
useful (Neyland, 2009, p.16). 
The Use of Biometrics for Aviation Security 
69 
 
 The DHS and its agencies have been exploring the use of biometrics in aviation 
security in these areas:  
 The verification of the identity of airport employees to ensure that access 
to secured areas are restricted to authorized personnel only;  
 The protection of public areas surrounding airports with the use of 
surveillance systems;  
 Verification of passengers when boarding aircrafts; and  
 Verification of flight crew before and during a flight (GAO, 2004, p.20).  
 Purchasing airline tickets to travel and border crossings are the focus for 
expressing concerns regarding privacy and forms of surveillance in the light of new 
technological developments. Airport managers have expressed the use of biometric 
systems in their airports based on reducing the speed of security checks in favor of 
increasing profit from the retail properties inside of airports.  
 For example, the use of facial scans for more rapid security checks would save 
time on the passenger, therefore, the passenger would spend extra time on shopping 
(Neyland, 2009, pp.136). Furthermore, the use of a chip in storage cards would allow 
airport managers to know who was who and their location in the airport as a means to 
enhance security by stopping access into prohibited areas, as well as, for passengers who 
had check-in but did not made their flight (Neyland, 2009, pp.136). 
 According to Neyland (2009) airport managers expressed mass problems that a 
biometric device might generate based on problematic identity claims and airports might 
not want to diminish their security records (Neyland, 2009, p.151). In developing the 
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biometric technology for the use in airports, it has to be measured in an airport 
environment and the views of stakeholders have to be considered. Vendors have to take 
into account what those technologies might be able to do, which ones to build, and who 
would be the beneficiaries of the technology.  
 Airport managers have to consider the potential for increased security, enhanced 
information regarding passenger movement, and increased shopping revenue against 
possible problems in identity confirmation and constant problems with security delays 
and security lapses (Neyland, 2009, p.151). 
Challenges and Issues to the Adoption of Biometrics Technologies  
 The limitation of technology has to be taken into account in the security process. 
For example, exception-processing procedures must be planned carefully as not all 
people can be enrolled in the biometric system. However, exception-processing that is not 
appropriate when primary is biometric processing could be a vulnerability to security, as 
it could be exploited and directly affect the performance of the technology (GAO, 2004, 
p.18).  
 In a study conducted by the General Accountability Office (GAO) for border 
security, it was concluded that recognition of the fingerprint is the most developed of all 
current biometric technologies in the market (GAO, 2004, p.19). Fingerprint recognition 
is the longest in used and with databases containing up to 40 million entries, enables it to 
be constantly expanding (GAO, 2004, p.19). The issuing process of credentials must be 
considered into the process in any form of identity management system (GAO, 2004, 
p.19).  
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 Biometrics help to ensure that people presenting themselves before the security 
system is the same as the person enrolled in the system (GAO, 2003, p.10). The purpose 
of the biometric is to identify and verify an identity, so to establish multiple identities 
could be a very difficult task as the system is to have one true identity. Therefore, 
biometrics cannot connect a person to his or her unique identity, if it was connected to a 
false identity from the beginning (GAO, 2004, p.10). 
 The selection to incorporate the use of biometrics as a security solution must 
consider the costs and benefits and its potential effects on privacy and convenience. The 
investment into a biometric system and its benefits, as well as, costs needs to be assessed 
and analyzed before its incorporation (GAO, 2003, p.20). An organization’s goals must 
take into consideration the desired objectives of the system as to the matching of 
identities on a watch list or the verification of identities as to verify that individual is who 
he or she is. Particular performance requirements must be described, as the time it would 
take to verify a person’s identity, and the maximum number that the system can hold 
(GAO, 2003, p.20).  
 Once the system performance requirements are set, a cost analysis could be 
created. The costs of the technology must be taken into consideration, as well as, the 
target population that it would affect (GAO, 2003, p.10). Initial costs must include efforts 
in engineering of the design, testing, system implementation; personnel training, network 
infrastructure, hardware and software, and additional facilities for the enrollment of 
people in the biometric system (GAO, 2004, p.15). 
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 Recurring costs factors include software and hardware system maintenance, 
hardware acquirement, training personnel, and program management (GAO, 2004, p.18). 
Additionally, other costs include hiring personnel for the enrollment process of people in 
the biometric system and purchasing identification documents for biometric storage.   
The consequence of performance issues such as accuracy problems, and their effect on 
the process, and people are important in selecting the right biometric solution (GAO, 
2004, p.18). 
Effects on Privacy and Convenience of Use  
 Federal agencies are limited on the disclosure of personal information as it relates 
to collection, storage, and usage of biometric information of fingerprints and photographs 
by the Privacy Act of 1974 (GAO, 2003, p.20). However, the act does include 
exemptions for national security and law enforcement purposes; and representatives of 
privacy and civil liberties groups have raised concerns related to (1) the adequate security 
protections put in place to handled identify theft, data sharing, and uses for biometric 
data, and (2) secondary uses also known as function creeps (GAO, 2004, p.20). Those 
concerns are related under the current law, as the legal system in the United States has 
not addressed the large-scale of data handling by a biometric system (GAO, 2010, p.10).  
 The broad exemption of the Privacy Act of 1974 does not provide guidance on its 
appropriate use for biometric information as it relates to national security or law 
enforcement purposes (GAO, 2004, p.20). Since there are no general consensuses, or 
criteria on the appropriate use of data sharing on the usage of biometric technologies, 
there must be a balance between matters of security and privacy as it pertains to 
73 
 
biometric system usage (GAO, 2004, p.21). Discussions on policy decisions are required 
as the current legal system has a range of unresolved policies, suggesting that the use of 
biometric technologies is based on management and technical policies (GAO, 2004, p.21) 
 Furthermore, consideration must be applied in the use of biometrics and its 
convenience would impact the government’s ability to achieve its goals. Some 
individuals could find the use of biometric technologies difficult and could resist it based 
on the personal beliefs of being uncomfortable to use, offensive, or intrusive (GAO, 
2004, p.21). A biometric system’s performance and adoption in commercial airports 
could be affected by an individual’s lack of cooperation and resistance, as the process 
could be lengthy or erroneous.  
 This could negatively affect the ability of the biometric system to operate and 
fulfill the government’s mission (GAO, 2004, p.21). The concern to adopt and use 
biometric technologies into the expedited screening of passengers in a commercial airport 
environment is based on the speed it would take to process each passenger and the 
accuracy of the verification rate that the technology would produce when deployed at 
airports (GAO, 2006, p.24).    
 Cavoukian, Chibba, & Stoianov (2012) in their research focused on having 
encryption into the biometric template of a person for the protection of privacy and use a 
numerical sequence to verify the individual. The government through its research through 
the GAO has not provided that solution in its biometric systems deployed in facilities and 
for further use in other areas (GAO, 2010, p.26). Furthermore, security cannot be based 
on technology alone, but through ATSA it did encouraged the adoption of biometric 
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technologies to enhance security systems. Additionally, presidential directives have been 
signed to adopt biometric technologies, but agencies with a mission in national security 
have yet to implement such systems into aviation security. 
 Even though, the use of biometric systems is not 100% accurate in security 
systems, it does allow for some accuracy when it comes to the identification of an 
individual as required by the 9/11 Commission Report. Additionally, the privacy rights of 
the individual must be protect by federal law, but since Trusted Traveler programs are 
voluntary, the individual provides consent to have its privacy rights waived in an 
exchange for a faster security experience.  
Summary of the Literature Review  
 The focus of the comprehensive literature review in this study was conducted to 
discuss expedited screening in Trusted Traveler programs within the DHS agencies 
dealing with aviation security, the adoption of biometric systems as a layer of security in 
commercial airports and its privacy provisions. An example of the use of biometric 
systems for identity verification was use to illustrate how the TSA uses the technology 
for its TWIC program. A description of biometric systems and the different types was 
used to provide examples of positive and negative outcomes of the various acquisition 
devices.  
 Davis’ (1989) TAM was presented to illustrate how an individual perceived ease 
of use and perceived usefulness affects the individual’s attitudes towards the acceptance 
of the technology that would be adopted into commercial airports. A descriptive of the 
accuracy of the various biometric technologies reflects the positive and negatives 
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outcomes when being integrated into the verification process of travelers in expedited 
screening. Furthermore, the description of the concept of privacy by Warren and Brandeis 
(1890) and by legal experts under tort laws illustrates a modern day approach to what is 
considered a person’s individual right to privacy.  
 Risk-based security was the foundation for the Trusted Traveler programs and for 
DHS agencies to apply their resources to become more efficient and effective as an 
organization. Examples of how biometric systems and their positive and negative effects 
were reflected on government assistance benefits programs to demonstrate the use of 
biometrics as a government statue.  
 The legal authority was presented to illustrate how legal jurisdictions 
subsequently affect the adoption and implementation of biometric systems and their 
compliance with federal, state, local, and international agreements. Lastly, the challenges 
and issues on the adoption of biometrics takes into account that biometric technology has 
its limitations and not all members of the population could enroll in such programs. 
Limitations such as congenital diseases, injuries, or the aging process, and the 
performance of the technology, must be kept to be relevant through time.  
  Additionally, the effects on privacy and convenience were presented to describe 
the trade-offs of personal privacy for modern day convenience of faster security checks. 
The information provided in Chapter 3 described the methodology that was used to 
conduct this study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate and explore if privacy concerns of 
travelers would be a factor in the adoption of biometric technologies in expedited 
screening procedures in commercial airports. In addition, does ease of use, usefulness, 
awareness of the technology, and security contributed to the adoption of biometric 
technologies in the expedited screening process at commercial airports as it related to 
Trusted Traveler Programs.  
Chapter 1 introduced the study and the problem statement and Chapter 2 
illustrated the relevant literature on expedited screening, risked-based security, biometric 
technologies, and the concept of privacy. It also addressed legal authorities, and privacy 
provisions; and the use of the TAM that created the theoretical foundation for this study. 
Chapter 3 explains the research approach that was utilized for this mixed-method 
investigation.  
Research Design and Approach 
In this mixed-method research study, the research questions were the foundation 
for the approaches that were used. The perception of privacy and the experiences of 
travelers using biometric systems reported to the DHS Privacy Office provided the 
attitudes and behaviors determining that the data would be of a qualitative nature.  
The case study approach was used as it involved developing an in-depth analysis 
of multiple cases (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). The data collection for a case study 
approach involves various sources that include quantitative data relevant to the overall 
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research design (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). This study used a purposive 
sampling method as it selected a small sample of units because of the valuable 
information to the research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). Contextual 
(holistic) strategies were used to interpret data in the context of a whole to include 
interconnections among all of the elements. The entire study was of a inductive-deductive 
cycle as at some points it would move towards a grounded result (facts and observations) 
as an inductive inference to a general inference (TAM) through the deductive inference 
of similar predictions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.26).     
Data Collection 
 The data collection consisted in a document review of previous peer reviewed 
journals, articles, and studies conducted on the effectiveness of biometric technologies 
and the attitudes and behaviors that could be generated if the technology would be 
implemented. The evaluation of privacy had to be considered, but it could not be based 
on the perception of an individual, as the federal government defines the concept of 
privacy based on the Privacy Act of 1974. The DHS Privacy Office collected and 
reported the privacy complaints of Trusted Travelers during the enrollment process or 
while experiencing the use of biometric technologies at ports of entry. These privacy 
reports are reported to Congress on a semiannual basis and are distributed without the 
disclosure of PII.  
 The DHS Privacy Office collects privacy complaints base on a set criteria that the 
federal government has categorized as violations based on the Privacy Act of 1974. These 
complaints are formal and DHS must take action to resolve the issue within a seven to ten 
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day period (DHS Privacy Office, 2012). I went to the DHS Privacy Office public website 
under archived annual privacy reports from (2011-2014) that provided the data that 
would answer the first research question in regards to privacy.  
 Secondly, the TSA made available the numbers of Trusted Travelers processed 
through expedited screening and those enrolled in TSA Pre-Check, public information 
through a study conducted by the GAO. I used those numbers and features to confirm 
them through the TSA databases, but could not disclose additional information as these 
databases are sensitive security information (SSI). The quantitative features provided the 
data as to demonstrate how expedited screening was deployed at commercial airports.  
 Additionally, I gathered public information through social media networks with 
the #TSAprecheck, #GlobalEntry and #TrustedTraveler to get a higher sample size than 
those obtained by the DHS Privacy Office (2011-2014). The information on social media 
networks provided more detailed information into the reactions of the population 
participating in Trusted Traveler programs and their experiences with biometric 
technologies and expedited screening at airports.        
Variables: Independent and Dependent Variables  
 In this study, the variables determine the findings and outcomes of the research 
conducted. I decided to have multiple variables that would create various outcomes. For 
example, a variable can take different values according to treatment, scenario, and other 
factors. In this study, I referred to independent variables as what has determined the 
outcome of a dependent variable (Creswell, 2007, P.152). For instance, in this study 
privacy, ease of use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the technology are 
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independent variables that could affect the outcome, which is the dependent variable if 
biometric technologies would be used and adopted into the expedited screening 
procedures at commercial airports. I wanted to explore the relationship among the 
variables and its effects on the possibility of biometric technologies be deployed as a 
security measure, if the technology was to be expanded as other agencies had.  
 
Figure 11. A graphic representation illustrating the independent variables and the 
dependent variable.  
Setting 
The TSA is responsible for implementing security screening procedures in 450 
airports in the United States and its territories for outgoing travelers through aviation 
security. The CBP is responsible for the screening of incoming travelers into the United 
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States from aboard. Currently, 121 commercial airports have expedited screening through 
the participation of Trusted Traveler Programs. These airports have on-site enrollment 
centers for those wanting to enroll in the program after viewing the process through prior 
security experiences. The archived data of this study was obtained from airports 
providing expedited screening specifically to Trusted Traveler program participants.  
Databases 
Publicly available GAO and OIG vetted data (reviewed and redacted), was used 
in this study. The information is based on actually Trusted Traveler program participants 
reported into the Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS), an application 
that assists authorized users throughout the TSA to report and track all of the Trusted 
Travelers processed through security screening checkpoints on a daily basis. The system 
keeps a running total of all of the Trusted Traveler participants processing in all 450 
airports, as other airports have expedited screening of the individual, but not of their 
belongings.  
 In addition, the Performance Information Management System (PIMS) allows 
those who have access the capability of generating a variety of reports for viewing based 
on set parameters (e.g. date range, region, busiest time, etc.) when required. Reports 
could be made to illustrate Trusted Traveler expedited screening by an airport, lane, 
busiest time, and date. The information is based on Trusted Traveler processing by the 
categorization of “LLLL” documented and reported into PMIS by all of the TSA airports.  
 The TSA offers expedited screening in seven categories (Appendix B) in the 
PMIS database, and this research study only focused on expedited screening for travelers 
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enrolled in a Trusted Traveler Programs administrated by a DHS agency. Data was 
collected from several audits and reports gathered from commercial airports and point of 
entries implementing expedited screening by the GAO and OIG. Those reports illustrate 
the process and security assessments of biometric technologies in border and aviation 
security. The information contained within the assessments and those analyses are 
considered public.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Research Question 1:  Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of 
biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?  
 This question was answered by the analysis of the qualitative data that was 
obtained from the formal complaints of the DHS privacy reports. The data was analyzed 
based on a case study approach. The case study approach allowed me to conduct a 
qualitative analysis based on a specific way of collecting, organizing, and analyzing the 
data based on analyzing a process (Patton, 2002, p.447). This method allowed for a 
thematic analysis that allowed for pattern recognition (Patton, 2002, p.452) 
Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, and 
security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening 
procedures at commercial airports?  
This question was answered through a deductive analysis based on TAM. Data 
triangulation was used to conduct a content analysis from previous document reviews. 
Data collected from social media sites was based on analytic induction to verify that the 
analysis was similar to those of the TAM. Lastly, the quantitative data collected from the 
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GAO reports illustrated the airport capabilities and the number of passengers receiving 
expedited screening at commercial airports. Afterwards, through the purpose of 
descriptive statistics, I illustrated through pie charts the perceptions of Trusted Travelers 
experiences using biometric technologies, and receiving expedited screening at 
commercial airports (Trochim, 2008). 
Data Analysis 
 The data analysis for this research is based on a content analysis. Content analysis 
refers to the researching of recurring words and themes (Patton, 2002, p.452). In this 
study, I analyzed documents from the GAO, privacy complaints, social media postings, 
and studies for recurrent patterns. The first part of the study that pertain to privacy 
concerns was based on an inductive analysis as the process was to discover patterns, 
themes, and categories in the data. 
 The second part of the study that dealt with variables that could impact the 
acceptance of biometric technologies in the expedited screening procedures was based on 
a deductive analysis, as the data was analyzed to the existing theoretical framework of 
Morosan (2012) and Davis’ (1989) TAM. A minimal sample of descriptive statistics was 
used for the data interpretation of the attitudes and behaviors of Trusted Travelers and 
commercial airports providing expedited screening and its capabilities.   
Protection of Participant’s Rights  
There are no participants or subjects used in this study. I requested permission 
from the Committee on Ethical Standards in Research for the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at Walden University. The entire data was collected and used as secondary data 
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within this study. The information provided from the GAO, OIG, and DHS Privacy 
Office is publicly available online at each agency’s official websites. The audits and 
surveys were vetted and redacted (reviewed and cleared) are considered public 
information and did not require permission from the DHS and TSA Office of Public 
Affairs for use. The use of public information reduces the possibility of disclosing SSI 
and protects the security assessments of both DHS agencies.  
I could not collect or use the data from the databases based on SSI procedures. I 
only used the databases to confirm previously released information made to the public 
through the GAO. As a covered employee under the TSA SSI Policies and Procedures 
Handbook (SSI Program, 2012) guidance on usage, I could reviewed the data to support 
the research based on the assessments conducted by the GAO (2014) regarding the usage 
of biometrics into the expedited screening process in commercial airports.  
 According to the TSA SSI Handbook Section 6.0 (2012) records containing SSI 
are not available for public inspection or copying and the TSA does not release records 
containing SSI to covered or non-covered persons who do not have a need to know. As 
written in the TSA SSI Handbook Section 6.1 (2012), a covered person is an individual 
or entity that has transportation or transportation security-related responsibilities to 
include, but not limited to, (a) anyone who is permanently or temporarily assigned, 
detailed to, attached employed by, or under contract with DHS, (b) regulated parties such 
as federal, state, local, and tribal government employees, contractors and grantees, as 
well as TSA stakeholders and industry partners; (c) committees of Congress; (d) other 
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persons with a need to know as defined in Title 49 code of federal regulations (2012) 
Section 1520.11; and (e) persons receiving SSI pursuant to other conditional disclosures.  
 Moreover, the specific data could not be approved for public disclosure as it 
contains information that if released publicly would be detrimental to transportation 
security. Furthermore, the use of PMIS and PIMS was solely used to support specific 
assessments conducted by the GAO (2014) and OIG (2012) regarding the number of 
Trusted Travelers receiving expedited screening at commercial airports.  
Summary 
 The primary focus of the research method in this study was to provide an 
extensive explanation of the process used to describe the research design and approach. 
The research method described the purposive sample and setting which consisted of 
current U.S. commercial airports providing expedited screening. The instruments and 
materials within this research study were collected from past OIG, GAO, and DHS 
Privacy Office Annual Reports to provide an overview of privacy concerns reported by 
travelers, biometric technologies used and tested, DHS agencies process of expedited 
screening at commercial airports, and its enrollment rates since the implementation of 
Trusted Traveler programs. The data collection provided the methods on how the data 
was collected. The research questions described how what methods were used to have 
them answered.   
The databases identify the system used for tracking Trusted Traveler expedited 
screening at commercial airports administered by the TSA. The data analysis explained 
the reason for the selection of specific methods of analysis to explore an in-depth 
85 
 
explanation of the two research questions. The protection of participants’ rights is 
addressed within the study to safeguard that any information gathered from a group or 
individual had been provided in advance and that full consent to use the information in 
this study was granted. Ethical issues within this study were presented to receive approval 
from the Committee on Ethical Standards in Research for the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at Walden University prior to conducting research.   
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
In order for biometric technologies to be adopted into the expedited screening 
procedures for the TSA Pre-Check Trusted Traveler program in commercial airports, 
DHS must address privacy requirements based on the Privacy Act of 1974.  DHS has to 
consider the differences in individuals’ perspectives, attitudes, and acceptance of the 
technology; as the “user” would be affected by the collection and use of the technology if 
adopted into the expedited security procedures.  
The results of this study would help the DHS and TSA understand the position of 
multiple entities that have an interest in the incorporation of such technology for stronger 
security measures. Entities include national governments, airport managers, airlines, 
industry experts, and the traveling public. Chapter 4 describes the process used to answer 
the two research questions that dominated the study.  
The first question framing the research addressed what the United States federal 
government classification of a formal privacy complaint under the Privacy Act of 1974.  
The complaints filed with the DHS Privacy Office have to be addressed and reported to 
Congress on a semi-annual basis.  
The research questions were: 1) Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the 
adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial 
airports? And 2) Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, and security 
affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at 
commercial airports?  
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The document review of the privacy complaints of travelers was analyzed for 
content to determine what privacy concerns were reported as it related to the use of 
biometric technologies. The reports reviewed were from 2009-2014. Although, Trusted 
Traveler programs began in 2009 through Global Entry by CBP, DHS had used biometric 
technologies under its program US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigration Status 
Indicator Technology) to control foreign travelers entering the United States. Under the 
US-VISIT program, DHS collects the ten fingerprints and digital photographs of most 
non-U.S. citizens while obtaining the US Visa and entering the United States (OBIM, 
2015).  
This process provides biometric identification services to state, local, and federal 
government officials helping immigration officers to determine if a particular person is 
eligible to receive a visa to enter the U.S (OBIM, 2015). The collection of biometrics is 
used to prevent identity fraud that can occur with documents used for identification and 
verification, unlike with biometrics as each is unique and impossible to forge (OBIM, 
2015). The program helps the U.S. government prevent people from using fraudulent 
documents to enter the country or have stayed after visa expiration (OBIM, 2015). In 
March 2013, the name of the program was changed to the Office of Biometric Identity 
Management (OBIM).  
DHS did not have information regarding formal complaints regarding Trusted 
Traveler Programs until 2013 with the official implementation of TSA Pre-Check in 121 
airports, so I had to review and collect data from formal complaints under the program of 
US-VISIT to determine the privacy concerns in regards to the use of biometric 
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technologies. Using a categorical strategy by breaking down the narrative of the data after 
reviewing 20 pages of privacy complaints, I did a context analysis and used the software 
of QSR International Nvivo 11 to code based on the three surrounding themes:  
1. Privacy concerns based on biometric technology experience through port of entries. 
2. Privacy concerns based on personal information inputted into databases.  
3. Privacy concerns based on interactions with government officials.  
The categorization into the three areas was done to show the accurate position of the 
federal government to accept these complaints as valid based on the requirements of the 
Privacy Act of 1974. Therefore, when someone from the traveling public would file a 
formal complaint it had to belong to the following categories to have a resolution from a 
government official from the DHS Privacy Office. This Chapter further includes 
descriptive statistics to reflect the various factors to include the expansion of expedited 
screening in airports based on Pre-Check enrollment, participating airlines, third party 
vendors, and increase participation into other Trusted Traveler Programs run by CBP.   
Data Collection 
 This mixed method design with an overall case study approach was based on the 
quantitative data that was released by the GAO in regards to the number of travelers 
receiving expedited screening from 2011 to 2014. This information was made public and 
was reviewed during the literature review to show stakeholders’ role of participation in 
Trusted Traveler Programs. Upon approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) with 
number 06-17-0269550, the study met ethical considerations, as no participants were 
used. 
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I received consent from the agency to be able to verify the accuracy of the 
numbers released to the GAO regarding the number of travelers receiving expedited 
screening in airports nationwide. I did not disclose SSI as the information did not 
mentioned a location, time, and technologies that would create a security risk. Once the 
numbers for expedited screening compared to the Trusted Traveler status eligible 
passengers was confirmed through the databases was correct. The public information of 
the quantitative data was placed into a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet categorized by year 
and compared to the Trusted Traveler’s enrollment compared to passengers receiving 
expedited screening at commercial airports.  
The purpose was to understand if privacy concerns were a factor in the adoption 
of biometric technologies if it would be used for expedited screening in commercial 
airports. The concept of privacy on a personal level was subjective and does not fit into 
the criteria of those underlined by the Privacy Act of 1974. Therefore, interviewing 
members of the traveling public would not have been a reliable source of data, as it 
would produce inconsistencies and not subject to government review. I went to the DHS 
Privacy Office and collected the reports that were presented to Congress regarding 
privacy complaints from 2009 - 2014.  
The reports provided the qualitative data that was used to analyze what exactly 
were the privacy complaints that the government took into consideration in regards to 
biometrics and Trusted Traveler Programs. Afterwards, the data was imported into Nivo 
11 and through a content analysis was categorized into the three most important 
categories previously stated to understand how the federal government determined 
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privacy violations. In addition, social media posts from Facebook between the years of 
2011-2014 of a sample size of 325 with the #TSAprecheck and #globalentry were 
gathered to determine the traveling public reactions regarding experiences using Trusted 
Traveler Programs. The information obtained from social media sites was collected to 
enhance and answer the second research question, as the information is considered public 
and accessible to anyone.  
Data Analysis 
Research Question 1: Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of biometric 
technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?  
 The qualitative data from the 50 privacy complaints from the annual reports was 
reviewed through a content analysis. I reviewed all 50 complaints for themes, patterns, 
and words. Through inductive analysis, I discovered that privacy concerns were reported 
based on the overall experience of the use of biometric technologies, errors inputted into 
databases, and interactions with government officials. I used Nvivo 11 to code the 
recurrent themes and was categorized into three categories:  
1. Privacy concerns based on biometric technology experience through port of 
entries,  
2. Privacy concerns based on personal information inputted into databases, and  
3. Privacy concerns based on interactions with government officials.  
The coding of the data was done through a content analysis of the privacy 
complaint. A sample of a privacy complaint and the agency’s disposition is in Appendix 
G. The privacy data was analyzed under these categories as it was the best form to 
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answer the first research question. Under the complaints received by the DHS Privacy 
Office, I wanted to know the submissions based on the type of privacy violations that 
occurred and how it would impact the study.  
The themes were based on reactions towards the use of biometric technologies at 
ports of entry, these includes ports, airports, and border crossings. I also was interested 
into the various complaints that the traveler would experience after submitting 
themselves to the biometric technology process and errors were done at no fault of the 
passenger, but of personal information captured incorrectly. The last category was 
created as various complaints were having a repetitive theme that government officials 
were the cause of the traveler’s dissatisfaction while undergoing security screening.  
Using Nivo 11, I reviewed the privacy complaints and highlighted the complaint 
into one of the three categories placing references through pattern recognition and 
thematic analysis. From the 50 formal complaints received from the DHS Privacy Office 
regarding to Trusted Traveler programs or individual’s having interactions with biometric 
technologies the results are as follows:  
The 5 (10%) complaints in the area of experience with biometric technologies 
through ports of entry had nothing to do with biometric technology. The complaints were 
done because the traveler did not understand why he or she was referred to secondary 
screening as they had registered for a Trusted Traveler Program and had willing paid the 
fee of $100 dollars. Therefore, the complaints were filed to receive clarification and vent 
about the experience during secondary screening selection. In the area of privacy 
concerns based on personal information inputted into databases 20 (40%) complaints 
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were regarding the errors during enrollment/or processing. Errors included placing 
fingerprints with incorrect names, dates of births, fingerprint captures, and poor quality of 
fingerprints taken.   
The last area of privacy concerns was based on interactions with public officials 
as the highest with 25 (50%) complaints. In this area, the common themes were 
mistreatment of government officials based on tone of voice, comments, and procedures 
not understood by the traveler. The passenger’s use of the term “violation of privacy” 
was based on searches conducted during secondary screening when during primary 
screening an alarmed had occurred that enabled government officials to conduct a more 
thorough investigation. Additionally, these complaints expressed many sentiments of the 
traveler while experiencing secondary screening such as “Feeling like a Criminal” 
“Feeling Uncomfortable”, “Feeling Violated”, “Questions Were Personal and Intrusive”, 
“Feeling Angry”, and “Treated Unprofessionally.” 
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Figure 12: Total percentage of privacy complaints from 2009- 2014 
After the data was analyzed and coded under the numerical form, each number 
was divided by 50 and then multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage; afterwards, it was 
placed into Microsoft Excel to create the detailed graph showed above illustrating the 
results of the analysis.  
The results of the analysis for the first research question demonstrated that 
privacy concerns do not have an impact on the adoption of biometric technologies into 
the expedited screening process. Based on the analysis, the traveler would not object to 
submitting to biometric technologies as long as they are treated with respect and the 
process of biometric capture is not intrusive and done correctly during the enrollment and 
security screening process. 
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Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, and 
security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening 
procedures at commercial airports? 
 This part of the research was based on a deductive analysis as the data was 
analyzed based on the theoretical framework of the TAM and Morosan (2012) research. 
The numerical data of expedited screening was collected by the TSA from October 2011 
through January 2014 and was released to the GAO in 2015. The content analysis shows 
in millions, the differences in the Secure Flight system producing TSA Pre-Check 
designated boarding passes compared to the actual number of passengers receiving 
expedited screening. The numbers beginning from October 2011 showing by each month 
are small for Pre-Check designation as only four airports were piloting the program. 
Delta Airlines was the first airline to provide the service to its frequent flyers, but 
expedited screening at the airports was not implemented until January 2012.  
 Multiple airlines such as Alaska Airlines, U.S. Airways, American and United 
Airlines joined TSA Pre-Check to have passengers eligible for expedited screening. TSA 
began processing passengers through expedited screening in only 30 airports. In 
November 2012, to increase expedited screening into Pre-Check designated lanes, the 
TSA incorporated the Managed Inclusion program to allow passengers without Pre-
Check designation and with the use of a randomizer, experience the benefits of expedited 
screening without registration into the Pre-Check program. By October 2013, the TSA 
expanded the Pre-Check program designated lanes in 121 airports nationwide and Virgin 
America, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue Airways and Southwest Airlines were added to the 
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expedited screening numbers. The addition of those airlines expanded the generation of 
Trusted Traveler designation into the Secure Flight program giving the boarding pass of 
passengers the Pre-Check status.  
Figure 13. Expansion of TSA expedited screening from October 2011- January 2014 
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Figure 14. Percentage of passengers screening by type from May 11, 2014 – May 18, 
2014 
The content analysis underlines the comparison of when Secure Flight designates 
the boarding passes with the Pre-Check designation and when the TSA began 
implementing expedited screening at commercial airports. The data shows that the system 
would over-designate boarding passes with the Trusted Traveler status, but commercial 
airports did not have the expedited screening capabilities to sustain the large volume of 
Pre-Check designation the Secure Flight system was producing.    
During the period of May 11, 2014, through May 18, 2014, the TSA implemented 
the programs of Managed Inclusion, Known Crew Traveler, and its risk assessment 
algorithms. 41% of the traveling public received expedited screening at the 121 
participating commercial airports compared to the 59% received standard screening. The 
long-term objective of the agency is to provide 100% expedited screening and a wait time 
of fewer than 5 minutes for Pre-Check participants and to increase voluntary enrollment 
(TSA, 2016).  
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However, the agency does not understand that the program may not be suitable 
for all members of the traveling public because some may travel once a year. Hence, for 
passengers traveling once a year would not a benefit in enrolling into a Trusted Traveler 
program. Therefore, the data will always be evolving as the relationship between 
expedited screening, and the airport resources and capabilities are changing based on the 
agency’s senior leadership objectives, additional airline participation, and financial 
budget.  
Additionally, private companies such as CLEAR and IDENTOGO are providing 
the service of enrollment with a fee for identity verification bypassing the travel 
document checker personnel at selected airports. Customers can skip the line but Trusted 
Traveler program enrollment is required to receive expedited screening at commercial 
airports or sporting events. These third-party vendors have conducted the research and 
dedicated resources in understanding that individual members of the traveling public 
would pay any fee, and have their biometric information collected and verified to reap the 
benefits of shorter and faster lines while traveling (INDENTOGO, 2016). 
An analytic induction was conducted based on a content analysis with documents 
from the literature review and previous studies. A sample of 325 social media posts were 
analyzed to capture the attitudes, perceptions, and concerns of the traveling public 
regarding their experiences with Trusted Traveler Programs, biometric technologies, and 
expedited screening. The data obtained from the DHS Privacy Office was not sufficient 
to make a generalization regarding the TAM and attitudes of Trusted Traveler 
participants.    
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The TAM could not be applied in this study based that I did not have access to the 
actual design of the biometric technologies being used by CBP at ports of entry. In 
addition, I did not conduct actual interviews of those that did have experience with those 
technologies as it would null the data of the privacy reports. However, the 325 social 
media postings provided an indication of how ease of use and usefulness are influential in 
the attitudes and behaviors towards biometric technologies (Shen et al., 2006).   
Based on the content analysis, the traveler feels ease to use the biometric 
technologies as it would provide an extended benefit, if it is non-intrusive and enhances 
security (Josha & Koshy, 2009). In the area of usefulness, passengers would accept 
submitting to biometric technologies as long as they are aware of its purpose. Individuals 
who choose to enroll in a Trusted Traveler program are made aware of the technologies 
being used and its purpose in the terms and conditions policies during the enrollment 
process.  
During the data analysis with the use of Nvivo 11, I created three categories and 
coded the social media posts based on the recurrent themes of (a) Shorter/faster lines; (b) 
Experience was enjoyable, easy, and pleasant, and (c) Frustration with the process 
during airport screening. I read all of the 325 posts and coded them based on the 
frequency of the themes experienced by travelers. The data was analyzed and coded 
under a numerical form; each number was divided by 325 and then multiplied by 100 to 
obtain a percentage. Then, it was placed in Microsoft Excel creating the detailed graph 
illustrating the results.  
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Figure 15: Social media analysis based on attitudes, perceptions, and frustrations. 
The analysis revealed the majority 147 (45.2%) of those experiencing Trusted 
Traveler status favored the shorter and faster lines. Third-Party vendors have explored the 
concept of shorter lines with the use of biometric technologies during screening for 
identity verification with positive results. 134 (41.2%) enjoyed the experience of the 
expedited screening process due to not removing shoes, electronics, liquids from carry-on 
bags, and belts. 44 (13.5%) experience frustration with the Trusted Traveler Program.  
Furthermore, I explored in-depth the themes causing frustration among travelers 
experiencing expedited screening at airports and ports of entry. Using the same process as 
previously with the 325 media posts, the number used to determine the frustrations of 
travelers experiences with expedited screening at airports is 44. The data was analyzed 
and coded under a numerical form; each number was divided by 44 and then multiplied 
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by 100 to obtain a percentage. Then, it was placed in Microsoft Excel creating the 
detailed graph illustrating the results.   
Out of the 44, 22 (50.0%) felt cheated about paying for the program because their 
boarding pass was not designated the Trusted Traveler status, non-enrollees were being 
placed into Trusted Traveler designated lines that did not know the divestiture process for 
expedited screening. 13 (29.5%) stated that Trusted Traveler designated lanes are longer 
than standard lanes. 9 (20.5%) were selected for additional or secondary screening while 
having Trusted Traveler status.  
Out of the 44, 22 (50.0%) felt cheated about paying for the program because their 
boarding pass was not designated the Trusted Traveler status, non-enrollees were being 
placed into Trusted Traveler designated lines that did not know the divestiture process 
towards expedited screening, 13 (29.5%) stated that Trusted Traveler designated lanes are 
longer than those at the standard lanes, and 9 (20.5%) were selected for additional or 
secondary screening while having Trusted Traveler status.    
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Figure 16: Social media analysis based on frustration with Trusted Traveler Programs. 
Therefore, the adoption of biometric technologies into the expedited screening 
process at commercial airports would be affected based on the common theme of wait 
time during the security screening process and not the technology. The analysis 
concluded that the traveling public would prefer to have security be efficient and fast 
without the process being intrusive to their person.  
Summary 
In Chapter 4, I presented the results of the data analysis from the document 
review of the formal complaints obtained from the DHS Privacy Office from 2009-2014. 
I explained by the TAM could not be tested based on the lack of accessibility to the 
system design. The social media analysis provided additional content into the behaviors 
and attitudes of travelers experiencing expedited screening in commercial airports.  The 
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analysis was conducted based on the data released by the TSA to the GAO and confirmed 
through its databases of PMIS and PIMS. The GAO and OIG provided the information of 
Secure Flight and the amount of passengers that received expedited screening at 
commercial airports. The data demonstrated that commercial airports do not have the full 
capabilities to increase the volume of expedited screening based on resources.  
Therefore, consideration must be made that the amount of passengers receiving 
expedited screening would constantly change as more commercial airports would add 
Pre-Check lanes and resources to support program participants. However, Secure Flight 
is over producing the Trusted Traveler designation on boarding passes, but commercial 
airports do not have the capabilities to process the high amount through expedited 
screening.  
During the time frame of this research, only 121 airports out of the 450 offer 
expedited screening for Trusted Traveler status designation. It does not account for 
additional airports that have implemented expedited screening, additional airline 
participation, and the removal of the Managed Inclusion program as it was used as a wait-
time management tool. Therefore, the amount of passengers receiving expedited 
screening is related to the airport having lanes designated for Pre-Check processing or 
standard lanes being converted into expedited screening and the resources to maintain 
them.  
The analysis and interpretation of the data in this mixed-method case study 
expressed that privacy was based on the definition provided by the Privacy Act of 1974 
and would not influence the adoption and usability of biometric technology in regards to 
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expedited screening procedures in commercial airports. The attitudes and behaviors of the 
traveler are towards wait times and shorter/faster security lines, and not the use of 
biometric technologies for the identification and verification process as a security 
measure for expedited screening. A discussion of the results is presented in Chapter 5 
with its conclusions and recommendations for further study.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a summary of the study and discusses the findings based 
on the theoretical frameworks by Morosan (2012) and Davis’ (1989) TAM. The focus 
was whether did privacy concerns would affect the adoption of biometric technologies in 
the expedited screening process at commercial airports.  In addition, I explored other 
variables such as those of ease to use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the 
technology to understand their effects on the adoption of biometric technologies into the 
expedited screening procedures as a security measure at commercial airports.  
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the limitations of this study and provides 
recommendations for future research and actions. The conclusion of this chapter finalizes 
with the implications for positive social change and what methods were implemented to 
date in regards to enhancing expedited screening in commercial airports.     
Summary  
The study focused on privacy as a variable into the adoption of biometric 
technologies into the expedited screening process at commercial airports. Furthermore, 
the study explored the attitudes, perceptions, and concerns regarding the ease of use, 
usefulness, and awareness of the biometric technology, and how its adoption would be 
affected as an enhancement of the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports.  
The research questions all surrounded on the theoretical concept of the TAM and 
provided new information to technology manufacturers of biometrics devices, 
government agencies, businesses, scholars, and public policy decision makers to decide 
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on the adoption of biometric technology as a security measure for the identity and 
verification process of those going through expedited screening at commercial airports. 
Such data would help the government agencies with the mission of national security to be 
able to reach a balance between the individual’s right to privacy and safeguarding the 
country.   
 In this study, I applied a mixed methodology approach with a focus of case study 
that involved a small about descriptive statistics (graphs) and a content analysis of 
secondary data from both quantitative and qualitative sources. During the numerical data 
sets, the data revealed that the internal system of Secure Flight was over producing the 
Trusted Traveler status designation more than the airport’s capabilities and resources 
allowed.  
As a result, there are increased wait-times or enrollees not screened through 
expedited screening procedures as required. The qualitative data through privacy 
complaints and social media posts were used as secondary data to enhanced and provided 
and in-depth view of the traveler’s experience with Trusted Traveler Programs at 
commercial airports and ports of entry.  
Interpretation of the Findings  
The use of biometric technologies has increased as a tool for identification, 
authentication, authorization, and accountability purposes. The literature review provided 
the information and the reasoning for the use of the technology as a security measure for 
identity identification and verification. For government agencies, biometric technology 
implementation in its programs is for national security interests and record management 
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into national databases. In the use of aviation security, many variables must be taken into 
account before the adoption of biometric technology can be implemented, such as airport 
size, personnel executing the program, databases maintenance, airline participation, 
technology manufacturers, and airport managers. In this mixed methodology study, I 
investigated the variables that would influence the adoption of biometric technology for 
use as a security measure for the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports 
in the United States.  
Findings for Research Question 1 
 The data analysis demonstrated that privacy concerns do not have an impact on 
the adoption of biometric technologies into the expedited screening procedures. The 
traveler would consent to their right to privacy to receive a benefit, or for the convenience 
of having a faster security line. Additionally, the biometric device capture has to be quick 
and non-invasive. The travelers referred the majority of the privacy concerns (50%) were 
based on the treatment of government officials during secondary security screening rather 
than concerns regarding the collection of their personal information through biometric 
technologies.   
Findings for Research Question 2  
 The TAM could not be applied as I did not have access to the actual design of the 
biometric technologies used by CBP at ports of entry. However, a 325 purpose sample of 
posts on social media sites provided an indication of how ease of use and usefulness 
influences the attitudes and behaviors towards biometric technologies.  The analysis 
revealed that the data provided by the TSA showed that the internal system of Secure 
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Flight had over produced the Trusted Traveler status designation, but not all 450 
commercial airports were offering expedited screening procedures or had Pre-Check 
designated lanes.  
Therefore, the commercial airports do not have the capabilities to provide 
expedited screening to the large volume of travelers having the Trusted Traveler status 
produced by Secure Flight.  In addition, to capture the attitudes, perceptions, and 
behaviors of the traveling public, a purposeful sample of 325 was analyzed to determine 
that 45.2% of the traveling public preferred Trusted Traveler designated status because of 
the shorter and/or faster lanes.  
41.2% enjoyed the experience of the expedited process as being easy and 
pleasant, and 13.5% were frustrated with the Trusted Traveler Program experience. I 
wanted to explore further the frustration of travelers regarding Trusted Traveler programs 
as it related to biometric technology. The results illustrated that 50.0% of Trusted 
Travelers felt cheated, as the status was not reflected on the boarding pass, or non-
enrollees were being placed in Trusted Traveler lanes without knowing the divesture 
procedures. 29.5% of travelers stated that longer lines were in Trusted Traveler 
designated lanes, and 20.5% were because of additional and/or secondary screening.   
Limitations of the Study 
This study had no limitations. The investigation was based on how privacy 
concerns would affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening 
process at commercial airports. Additionally, I also explored if awareness, ease of use, 
security, and usefulness of the technology would affect the adoption of biometric 
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technology into the expedited screening procedures. If the study had included actual 
interviews of participants regarding their sentiments about privacy, the answers to the 
research questions would have been different and results would not be those reflected in 
the study.  
The results based on the content analysis from the information obtained from the 
DHS Privacy Office illustrated that not many people filed privacy complaints or that the 
government discard them as it did not met the federal government’s definition of privacy.  
Therefore, government agencies are required to abide by the law, and are not subjective 
as individuals and corporations could. The Privacy Act of 1974 only applies to 
government programs and private companies are regulated through their own terms of 
service.  
The small sample size of 50 privacy complaints obtained by the DHS Privacy 
Office (2009-2014) demonstrated that the agency had not collected enough data or it 
collected enough to meet the required minimum reporting requirements. The small 
sample size collected over the years was used to make general assumptions of privacy 
complaints in all of the United States and its territories, and not a specific region, state, or 
city.  
Additionally, the information obtained from the privacy complaints that was 
analyzed was not enough and other secondary sources were needed. I was able to get a 
wider perspective of the feelings of travelers through social media sites as they shared 
their experiences with Trusted Traveler Programs and expedited screening at commercial 
airports.  
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Additionally, I was not allowed to disclose information that was not made public 
by the TSA previously. Under its SSI program, I was only allowed to verify information, 
but could not disclose other information that would have had major contributions to this 
study, if accessible. Therefore, the initial plan to compare and categorize commercial 
airports based on their enplanements, personnel resources, technology, and wait-times 
based on expedited screening was not possible. The non-disclosure of information created 
a limitation because the research questions had to be answered through the limited data 
that the agency had already released two years prior.      
Discussion 
According to TSA records, biometric security measures are being piloted to 
include retinal scans that enable identification of passengers based on a unique set of 
identifiers such as iris scans and fingerprints (TSA, 2012). Aviation security experts 
suggested that security should be categorized into three parts: Items (Threats), Identity 
(Passengers/Travelers), and Intent (Purpose). The TSA has made improvements in the 
area of implementing the IATA version of the checkpoint of the future, but has 
concentrated in the area of fraudulent boarding passes, instead of identifying and 
verifying the traveler’s true identity (TSA, 2012).  
Jackson, Chan, & Latourette (2011) argued about the consequences a Trusted 
Traveler Program presents to the advantages of terrorists wanting to evade security 
measures. First, a terrorist could apply for and be granted Trusted Traveler status, 
providing them “authorized access” to that particular line (Jackson et al., 2011, p.3).  
Second, terrorist could identify members of the public who are Trusted Travelers and 
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force them into carrying weapons through the Trusted Traveler line (Jackson et al., 2011, 
p.3). Lastly, members of the public that are Trusted Travelers could become terrorists 
(either by recruitment or by self-radicalization) and stage an attack before their changed 
risk level was discovered and their Trusted Traveler status was revoked (Jackson et al. 
2011, p.3). 
Furthermore, Jackson et al. (2011) stated that the reasoning for the limited 
expansion of Trusted Traveler Programs in the United States is because if terrorists can 
gain access based on the three forms stated previously, it would reduce the benefits of 
such programs. They suggested that some fraction of the terrorists will apply, and some 
may be accepted as Trusted Travelers depending on the nature of their background check 
and the rates of false positives (incorrectly flagging an innocent person as a threat) or a 
false negative (misidentifying a terrorist as a nonthreat) (Jackson et al. 2011, p.5). 
However, the baseline probability of detection is the most important factor in aviation 
security standards as all passengers, regardless of status would be receiving x-ray 
screening of their property and a walk through metal detector of their person (Jackson et 
al. 2011, p.5).  
The quality of the background checks also plays a significant role in the 
acceptance and implementation into the Trusted Traveler Program by reducing the rates 
of false positives and false negatives, allowing for security to be more efficient and using 
its resources for travelers where information is limited or unknown (Jackson et al. 2011, 
p.15). However, terrorists could already use population that receives expedited screening 
as a condition of their employment to gain access through security checkpoints, such as 
111 
 
pilots, airline crew, airport employees, and bribing security officials under existing 
security models (Jackson et al. 2011, p.15).   
Jackson et al. (2011) made the correlation between the baseline of security 
performance and a terrorist ability to be able to gain Trusted Traveler status based on the 
quality of the background checks; making the programs a tool for terrorist to circumvent 
security screening. However, the RAND Corporation report (2011) stated that the TSA 
when it was created in 2001, provided the head of the agency the ability to establish a 
registered traveler program with the requirements that fliers must provide personal 
information, including biometrics, and submit to a background to verify, whether they 
present a threat to commercial aviation or not (RAND, 2011). Trusted Travelers would 
receive expedited security screening and a more convenient and comfortable travel 
experience, but security screeners would still reserve the right to increase the intensity of 
the screening, if the Trusted Traveler were suspicious or chosen randomly for secondary 
screening (RAND, 2011). 
Airports managers and stakeholders argued that technology must be efficient, 
precise, and time-saving as too much time being spent in the security process could 
become a deterrent for those wanting to travel for either business or pleasure. However, 
since Trusted Traveler Programs are voluntary those choosing to enroll received the 
benefits of being pre-screened by the integration of biometrics; and can received a faster 
security experience as they are granted low-risk status allowing for more time to be spent 
on other things in the airport such a shopping and dining; while waiting for their flight 
increasing commerce and revenue for all stakeholders involved.  
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The introduction of biometric technology into the expedited security screening in 
commercial airports would create the balance in its desire to deter terrorist from applying 
into the program, while at the same time delivering clear benefits to innocent travelers 
who take the time to apply and pay the registration fee (RAND, 2011). Furthermore, the 
primary variable based on the report is how effective the background check would be. 
The reasoning behind it is what makes the program desirable to the flying public also 
makes it attractive to a terrorist (RAND, 2011). 
In regards to matters of privacy, privacy advocates have identified privacy 
concerns with the use of facial recognition technology for its ability to recognize 
individuals in public environments without their consent, and collect their information, 
and then share their personal data (Facial, 2015, p. 13). One of the concerns is the 
reduction of anonymity that affects the privacy of a person when in a public environment, 
if choosing to be in public (Facial, 2015, p.13). However, the Center for Democracy & 
Technology stated: when most individuals are in public, there is an expectation that some 
business and people would recognize their faces, but only a few would make the 
connection between the name of the face especially in matters of internet behaviors and 
travel patterns (Facial, 2015, p.13).  
Furthermore, privacy advocates stated: since being recognized in public settings 
becomes more common, some individual may not be comfortable shopping in specific 
establishments, gathering in public for a supporting cause, or visiting certain places 
(Facial, 2015, p.14). The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) stated that 
individuals lose control over their identity, if they do not have the option to want to 
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remain anonymous in public settings. Facial technology adds additional privacy concerns 
as its use is not only to identify the individual, but also those they are with (Facial, 2015, 
p.14).  
The World Privacy Forum stated that the majority of individuals may find it 
invasive to their privacy, if security cameras were used in the tracking of their 
movements for marketing strategies (Facial, 2015, p.14). An additional privacy concern 
is the identification or verification of the individual without its consent or knowledge. 
Unlike those of other biometric technologies, facial recognition can be utilized to capture 
the face at a distance with the individual knowing, and as the technology grows the 
option of opting out may be less feasible for the utilization of the technology (Facial, 
2015, p.15).  
The biggest privacy issues with the use of facial recognition are: 
 Individual control over personal information: The matter that personal data is 
associated and collected with facial recognition could be shared, used, and sold 
without the person’s consent (Facial, 2015, p.16).  
 Data security: The data collected by the facial recognition technology can be 
subject to data breaches that could be exposed to unauthorized entities (Facial, 
2015, p.16). The risk of theft of data could increase the possibilities of stalking, 
identity theft, and harassment (Facial, 2015, p.17). Industry experts believe that 
security concerns are mitigated, as present facial print algorithms are tailored to 
the vendor and, there is little use, if received through a breach (Facial, 2015, 
p.17).  
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 Misidentification: The matching of someone’s image is captured and 
misidentified with the incorrect identification of an individual leading to long-
term consequences without the knowledge of the individual (Facial, 2015, p.17). 
 Disparate treatment: Individuals who may not have consented to facial 
recognition could be denied access to particular services and products. Therefore, 
the use of patterns of behavior and personal characteristics could be used to make 
generalization leading a person be discriminated based on certain groups (Facial, 
2015, P.17).  
Stakeholders have expressed that the technology does not present unusual privacy 
risks that already exist and could be reduced as the benefits would be weighed towards 
what the technology offers (Facial, 2015, p.17). They argued that: 
 Individuals should not expect complete anonymity in public: It is contended that 
privacy and anonymity are not the same and that losing complete anonymity is 
not a surrender of privacy. The capturing of a facial image of a face print in 
public is not the same as removing a person’s anonymity, as it does not reveal 
any personal information (Facial, 2015, p.18). 
 Surveillance is already part of our daily life:  Public places already have security 
cameras and facial recognition does not increase their use (Facial, 2015, p.18).  
 Individuals have demonstrated a willingness to give up privacy for the benefits 
technology: Individuals have demonstrated their willingness to share personal 
information in public, by posting on social networking sites. Therefore, the trade-
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offs between losing some privacy and the benefits of new technologies offer 
businesses opportunities for economic development (Facial, 2015, p.18).  
 The need for consent should be based on the context: The need for individual 
consent should rely on the framework under which facial recognition technology 
is utilized. In matters of security, there may not be a requirement to ask for 
permission when using the technology compared to social networking sites which 
have repositories of facial images to identify individual on a boarder scale 
(Facial, 2015, p.19).  
Privacy advocates expressed that the technology should have “privacy by design” 
which are the building of privacy protections at every stage of development. For 
example, manufacturers of biometric technologies could design into their systems that the 
data collected, be used for specified purposes, and then, erasing the data after used 
ensuring that repurposing of the data is disabled (Facial, 2015, p.25). 
Conclusions 
The current research makes the suggestion that travelers are willing to waive their 
privacy concerns regarding the use of biometric technology, if the process is short on 
time and that the security process is fast. The biometric technology that is used to 
implement CBP Trusted Traveler programs utilizes a multi-model of fingerprint and 
facial recognition for incoming passengers in port of entries in the United States and its 
territories. Therefore, if the TSA would incorporate the same model, it could also address 
the issue of wait times as the traveler would have already verified their identity through 
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dedicated kiosks minimizing the wait time in security lines. This concept has already 
been introduced in the private sector with the CLEAR Program. 
The industry has added the product of Trust Traveler status to avoid the long 
security lines at commercial airports and sporting events. The CLEAR program has an 
annual enrollment cost of $179 and supports the argument that individuals are willing to 
pay such a fee for shorter lines (Crowley & Ross, 2009). However, CLEAR is not subject 
to the Privacy Act of 1974, but it is regulated by its own terms of service. CLEAR is 
available at 11 airports in the United States and works by passing through two steps: 
identity verification and security screening.  
Travelers who enrolled in CLEAR have their separate lane for the first step, 
where they can utilize biometric authentication (Fingerprint or Iris Scan) at a kiosk rather 
than wait for a TSA agent to inspect their ID and scribble something on the boarding pass 
(Steele, 2015). After the identity has been verified, a CLEAR representative will escort 
the traveler to the actual security screening, bypassing everyone waiting in line (Steele, 
2015).  
CLEAR is utilized by passengers who have first enroll online, and then visit an 
airport location where their identity is verified, and biometrics are collected and recorded 
into the vendor’s system (Steele, 2015). The enrollment in CLEAR can be done at any 
CLEAR location with no appointment, and the card is shipped within 5 to 7 business days 
(Steele, 2015). However, enrolling in CLEAR does not mean that the traveler has Trusted 
Traveler status; it is just a program that allows individuals to skip the line and the identity 
verification of the TSA personnel (Steele, 2015). 
117 
 
Those who have enrolled in CLEAR must also enroll into a federal managed 
Trusted Traveler Program to receive its benefits for expedited screening as CLEAR only 
bypasses the identity verification portion of the screening as it is conducted by CLEAR 
Kiosks (Steele, 2015). Furthermore, the federal government must balance the individual’s 
right to privacy under the Privacy Act of 1974 and those of national security.  
The U.S Patriot Act of 2001 made it that the federal government does not have to 
follow restrictions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as issues of national security would take 
priority. In addition, national security interests are one of the twelve exceptions that the 
federal government has as a means to implement national security programs. 
However, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the law that controls the federal government 
into having privacy impact assessments and offices at every department to safeguard 
itself from litigation. The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 enables for multiple governmental 
agencies to share information and programs in the process to combat terrorism based on 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 (EPIC, 2016).  
However, the balance between the interpretation of an individual’s right to 
privacy and national security interests relies on the judicial system and which supreme 
justice would favor the federal government’s position in fighting terrorism or the 
individual’s right to privacy. The laws in the justice system have not been kept up with 
advances in technology in the digital age.   
Implications for Social Change  
The results of this study within the body of research on social and political change 
may be used to enhance the discussion for the U.S. Supreme Court to bring a clear 
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interpretation of the fourth amendment and the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001. The study 
contributes to the deficiency in the literature as it addressed the privacy aspect of Trusted 
Traveler Programs and the purpose biometric technologies could serve in the 
enhancement of expedited screening procedures at commercial airports as a national 
security objective.  This study could provide scholars, authorities, and industry experts’ 
opportunities in deciding which actions should be implemented in their policies as it 
relates to Trusted Traveler Programs.  
The study revealed that the traveling public is more concern with wait times and 
shorter or faster lines, and are willing to undergo any screening process that allows them 
to have a reduction in their time during security screening at commercial airports. The 
study illustrated that the traveling public is willing to consent to their right to privacy for 
the convenience of shorter and faster lines, as they can spend less time during security 
screening at commercial airports.  
The objective of this research was to make a contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge to foster a continuation of a change-oriented debate in matters of public 
policy. The adoption of biometric technologies in Trusted Traveler Programs specifically 
for the TSA Pre-Check Program in the expedited screening process may interest other 
countries around the world with similar legal systems as those of the United States, into 
implementing biometric technologies in programs of the same nature (Neyland, 2009).   
Recommendations 
 The DHS should combine all of its Trusted Traveler Programs into one database 
and in the same format for all of its components. The incorporation of having one 
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database would reduce double efforts into creating different databases, maintenance, 
security patches, equipment, facilities, and training of personnel. The purpose of Trusted 
Traveler Programs is the same; regardless of the government agency that is overseeing its 
implementation. The overall focus is the continuation of a security model based on 
intelligence and risk assessments by allocating resources to individuals that are 
categorized at a higher risk.  
As the TSA implements its Trusted Traveler Program through Secure Flight and 
its designation into the passenger’s boarding pass, CBP employs radio frequency 
identification technology to allow pre-screened travelers expedited processing at 
designated port of entries (OIG, 2014, p.1). Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a 
form of automatic identification and data capture technology that uses radio frequencies 
to transmit information (OIG, 2014, p. 1). CBP attaches a RFID tag in each Trusted 
Traveler Program card and travelers who choose to participate in the program, voluntary 
submit PII through a web-based application system that CBP uses to handle the 
enrollment and vetting process (OIG, 2014, p.3). 
Furthermore, CBP stores applicants’ data (biographic data, facial photographs, 
and background investigation results) in a database. At ports of entry, RFID readers scan 
the Trusted Traveler cards and use the unique number embedded in each card to retrieve 
the passenger’s data through an encrypted network (OIG, 2014, p. 3). The CBP Officer 
uses the passenger’s information shown on the monitor to authenticate the traveler’s 
identity (OIG, 2014, p.3).  
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The CBP uses the RFID technology for registered travelers for expedited border 
crossings and airports enrolled in their Trusted Traveler Programs. CBP maintains the 
integrity of these programs through a stringent screening process that includes automated 
searches against multiple law enforcement databases, 24-hour system checks to verify the 
status of enrolled travelers, and random selections of registered travelers for secondary 
inspection (OIG, 2014, p.4).  
Additionally, CBP implemented a program to apply security patches to the servers 
and databases that support these programs and has created testing environments to see the 
effects of security patches before deploying its production systems (OIG, 2014, p.5). CBP 
does not store any PII on the Trusted Traveler Program cards, and only the unique 
identification number is present, this is done in the event that an attacker obtains the 
information to produce a duplicate card, CBP officers can mitigate the threat by verifying 
the travelers’ PII and picture presented on their terminal (OIG, 2014, p.6).  
The TSA should incorporate the same system of assigning cards and kiosks for 
those enrolled in Trusted Traveler Programs for the identity verification of the traveler 
using the same technologies and databases, instead of creating a different system as both 
agencies are under the DHS umbrella. The CLEAR program makes the concept workable 
and is deployed at 11 commercial airports and CBP has also deployed the technology for 
over two years and has had much success with the traveling public participating in 
Trusted Traveler Programs. Therefore, by combining resources and placing all Trusted 
Traveler Programs into one system, the concept would be easier to manage and would 
reduce operating expenses compared to having two agencies manage separate programs.   
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Appendix B: Seven Categories the TSA Uses for Expedited Screening 
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Appendix C: List of the Trusted Traveler Programs in the United States 
 
Courtesy of Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (2015) 
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Appendix D: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system used by CBP Trusted 
Traveler Programs  
 
Courtesy of Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (2014) 
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Appendix E: Sample of CBP Trusted Traveler Program Cards 
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Appendix F: The CBP Trusted Traveler Programs with the TSA Pre-  System 
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Appendix G: Samples of Privacy Complaints 
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Appendix H: Samples of Social Media Posts 
 
